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STATE OF GEORGIA 
Cert to Ga Ct App (Quillian, 
McMurray, Pope) 
State/Criminal Timely 
[In my preliminary memorandum in this case, I mistaken-
ly indicated that no response had been received. A response 
was received and distributed after the petn was distributed.] 
RESPONDENT'S CONTENTIONS: The State responds that the 
revocation of petr's probation did not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Wealth has not generally been held to be a 
"--s+~Ll ~) ~ ~ · ~ 
- ~ -
suspect classification. The Court has invalidated several 
state laws which interefered with the rights of indigents to 
obtain review of their convictions, see, e.g., Griffin v. Il-
linois, 351 u.s. 12 (1956), but regardless of the level of 
scrutiny applied in those cases, only the rationality test 
should be applied to probation revocation decisions. That 
lesser level of scrutiny was applied in Tate v. Short, 401 
U.S. 395 (1971) and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
The State next asserts that revocation of probation for 
failure to pay fines or to make restitution is rational. If 
it is rational to consider financial ability when making the 
decision to grant probation, it is also rational to consider 
it in the decision to revoke probation. As a convicted bur-
glar with a new burglary charge pending, petr was no longer a 
good probation risk when he lost his job and his ability to 
make the required payments. The principles of Williams and 
Tate are not contrary. 
The State acknowledges that there is a conflict among 
the lower courts on this issue and that "[a]t some point this 
conflict should be resolved." 
DISCUSSION: The response makes it clear that petr's 
probation was revoked because of his failure to make the re-
quired payments. In light of the conflict acknowledged by the 
State, and the dissenting opinions in Woods v. Georgia, 450 
u.s. 261 (1981), I recommend that the Court grant the petn. 
There is a response. 
June 11, 1982 Holzhauer Opn in petn 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
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No. 81-6633 
BEARDEN Cert to Ga Ct App (Quillian, 
McMurray, Pope) 
v. 
STATE OF GEORGIA State/Criminal Timely 
SUMMARY: Petr contends that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohi_bi ts revocation of probation when an indigent is 
unable to pay a fine or make restitution. 
,7 
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Petr pleaded guilty in Octo-
ber, 1980, to burglary and stolen property charges. As a 
I 
first offender, he~as on 
,. 
the sloen property charge, and three years probation for the 
burglary. As a condition of his probation he was required to 
pay a fine of $500 and restitution totalling $250. The pay-
ments were to be made in installments, the last due in Febru-
ary, 1981. In May, 1981, the state moved to revoke patr's 
probation on the grounds that he had committed another bur-
glary, failed to report to his probation officer as directed 
and failed to pay $550 of his fine and restitution. The trial 
court revoked the probation and sentenced him to five years 
imprisonment, relyingfJri tirely on petr's failure to make the ~ 
required payments and to report to his probation officer. See 
Order, reprinted in petn at 60-61. 
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. The court as-
sumed for purposes of appeal that the revocation for failure 
to report to the probation officer was erroneous bacause petr 
was not notified of that ground for revocation prior to his 
hearing. (The petition for revocation, reprinted in petn at 
2-3, does not mention failure to report.) However the court 
held that the failure to make the payments required as a con-
dition of probation provided a separate basis for revocation. 
The court rejected petr's equal protection claim, relying on 
two state cases but noting the contrary implication of Justice 
White's dissent in Woods v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 284-287 
(1981). The Georgia Supreme Court denied cert. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr asserts that the Ga Ct App decision 
conflicts with a decision of CAS, Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 
- ~ -
550 (CAS 1q77), vacated as moot, 439 u.s. 1041 (1978). The 
same issue was left unresolved in Wood v. Georgia, supra. The 
Court decided the case on other grounds after granting the 
petn on the issue raised here. Justices Brennan, White and 
Marshall would have reached the equal protection issue and 
would have held that revocation was impermissible. The state 
court decision conflicts with the principles of several deci-
sions of this Court. See Tate v. Short, 401 u.s. 395 (1971) ~ 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 u.s. 235 (1970)~ Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). It violates the Equal Protection 
Clause to imprison an indigent for his inability to pay a 
fine. 
DISCUSSION: I recommend calling for a response. This 
case does present the issue left unresolved in Wood v. Geor-
~, but with a few new wrinkles. Restitution is involved 
here in addition to a fine, and there may be other grounds for 
revocation. No mention is made in the petn or the opinions / 
below as to what happened to petr's second burglary charge. ~ 
I recommend CFR. 
June 10, 1982 Holzhauer Opn in petn 
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81-6633 
ABSENT NOT VO'ri NG 
~~~;vv~ 
drk 01/10/83 ~k/.d ~ ~ ~  . , 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell January 10, 1983 
From: Rives 
No. 81-6333, Bearden v. Georgia 
Question Presented 
The issue is whether the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits the revocation of an indigent defendant's probation 
for his failure to pay a fine to the state and restitution to 
the victims of his crime. 
2. 
I. Background 
In October 1980, petr pled guilty to separate counts 
of burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. Under the -~ ....,.,~.,. IZ;;yr~~-­
Georgia first offender statute, the trial court did not. ente a  
-1 
judgment against petr. Instead, it deferred further 
proceedings and placed petr on probation, conditioned on 
payment of a fine and restitution. With respect to the charge 
of burglary, petr was placed on probation for three years, 
conditioned on payment of a fine of $500 and restitution of 
$50. With respect to the charge of theft by receiving stolen 
property, he was placed on probation for a period of one year, 
...c:;;... 
conditioned on payment of $200 restitution. He was required to 
pay $200 immediately, the balance of §550 to be paid within 
four months. 
When petr was sentenced in October, he was employed 
by Rockwell International. He borrowed the initial payment of 
$200 from his parents, who are also poor. His father is a 
retired, disabled veteran and his mother stays home to take 
care of her husband. One month later, in November 1980, petr 
was laid off from his job. Petr sought other work in the 
community but could not obtain it. When the time to pay the 
balance of the fines and restitution arrived in February 1981, 
petr lacked the money to pay. He notified the probation 
officer that he lacked t:~o&ey~t~ying to get the 
money up. Petr was not;r _~ged then for violating his 
probation. In May 1981, petr was arrested for committing a 
burglary. The state moved to revoke his probation, both for 
~ 
_, . 
committing the burglary and for failing to pay his fine and 
restitution. 
At a hearing on the state's motion, the state 
abandoned the burglary charge as a ground for revocation--a 
charge of which petr later was acquitted. The state, however, 
contended that petr had failed to meet with his probation 
officer as required and had failed to pay his fine and 
restitution. The trial court agreed and found that it was 
required to revoke probation under the previous court order: 
"I'm well aware of the indigency provision, and I 
know that there are times when a person doesn't have 
funds that he's supposed to have, but in any event, 
the Court finds that this defendant has failed to 
abide by the previous order of this Court ..• in 
failing to pay the amount ordered to be paid •..• " JA 
at 45. 
On appeal, the state court found that the state had 
failed to provide petr with notice that it would revoke his 
probation for failing to meet with his probation officer. 
Accordingly, this ground could not be relied on to uphold the 
trial court's order. The court determined, however, that the 
petr's failure to pay was sufficient reason to revoke 
probation. It accepted petr's contention that he was unable to 
pay, but rejected his claim that the constitution prevented the 
state from discriminating on the ground of indigency. 
II. Contentions 
A. Petr contends that strict scrutiny is appropriate when the 
state has deprived indigents completely of fundamental or basic 
rights. Here, petr has been denied his liberty because of his 
indigency. Moreover, because the sentence was not entered 
until his probation was revoked, Georgia's classification on 
the basis of wealth deprived him of the fundamental right to 
4. 
vote. Accordingly, the validity of the statute is to be judged 
under strict scrutiny. Alternatively, petr contends that even 
if the statute is judged under a rational relation test, it 
will fail. In providing for a fine, the state's purpose is to 
determine whether the probationer may be rehabilitated. By 
revoking the ~enever a probationer cannot pay, as 
indigents cannot, the state in effect has made a judgment that 
the poor may not be rehabilitated. This is an irrational 
assumption. The same irrational assumption was rejected in 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and should be rejected 
here. 
B. Resp's contentions 
Resp contends that the proper standard of review is 
to determine whether there is a rational relationship between 
the legislature's purposes and the means the state has used to 
accomplish them. The state is seeking to protect !E ree 
~.:_::~· (! i_r_~9 the state has an interest in rehabilitating 
the probationer. The legislature rationally could have 
determined that when a probationer is unable to pay the fines 
and restitution on which his probation is conditioned, he is no 
longer a likely candidate for rehabilitation. There are 
numerous studies that show that there is a strong empirical 
link between criminal activity and poverty. Further, it is 
) / 
,, .. 
well accepted that a judge may take a defendant's financial 
status into account when he decides whether probation is 
appropriate in the first place. There is no reason why he 
should not be able to take it into account when he decides 
whether probation should be revoked. 
Second, the state has an interest "in protecting 
==:::::: 
5. 
society by maintaining public confidence in Georgia's criminal 
justice system." Red Brief at 22. If petr could escape 
punishment because of his indigency, then the public would have 
little confidence that its criminal justice system is imposing 
punishment equally. 
F~ly, the state's policies favoring restitution 
also are served by revoking petr's probation for his failure to 
pay. The trial judge may have granted the probation initially 
because he thought petr would be able to repair the injury done 
to the victims of his crime. Once petr demonstrated that he 
could not pay the victims, this reason for placing him on 
probation was removed. 
III. Discussion 
The Court pre~iously has considered~hat 
bear on this area. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 u.s. 12 (1956), 
the Court found invalid a state statute that conditioned a 
criminal defendant's right to appeal on his ability to pay for 
a transcript of the trial proceedings. It reasoned, "In 
criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of 
poverty than on account of religion, race, or color. Plainly 
,. , 
6. 
the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational 
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not 
be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial." 
Id., at 17-18.~ 
In ¥J illiams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), the 
Court extended the "teaching" of Griffin to classifications 
based on wealth that affected sentencing. The appellant in 
Williams had been convicted of petty theft. Under the Illinois 
statute, the maximum sentence allowed was a year's imprisonment 
and a $500 fine. After having served the maximum time in jail, 
the appellant, who was indigent, was unable to pay the fine. 
According to Illinois law, he was to be kept in jail to "work 
off" his fine and court costs at the rate of $5.00 per day. 
The Court found that the statute "worked an invidious 
discrimination" against indigents in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. It reasoned that "once the State has 
defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy 
...,____._._____~
its penological interests and policies, it may not then subject 
a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of 
imprisonment beyond the maximum solely by reason of their 
~ _______ _____, 
indigency." Id., at 241-242. 
The Court noted that its holding did not forbid a 
court from confining an indigent to "work out" a fine as long 
as he is not incarcerated longer than the statutory maximum. 
It also expressly reserved the question of whether a 
<:.- -~
legislature may provide alternate penalties of 30 days or $30, 
holding "only that a State may not constitutionally imprison 
' ' 
7. 
beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is 
financially unable to pay a fine." Id., at 243. Finally, it 
indicated that rather than imposing a lump sum fine against 
indigents, a state could adopt a scheme whereby the defendant 
would pay the fine over time. See id., at 244-245 & n. 21. 
/ 
In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 399 (1971), the Court 
considered a related situation. The defendant had been fined 
$425 for accumulated traffic offenses, which his indigency 
prevented him from paying. Although these offenses were not 
punishable by imprisonment, the defendant was placed in prison 
to work off the amount of his fine. The Court held that "Texas 
••. cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, 
limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one is able to 
pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for an indigent 
defendant without the means to pay his fine." Id., at 399. 
The particular vice in Short was that the State had found that 
its peneological interests did not require any prison term to 
be served but imposed a prison terms on indigents because of 
their inability to pay. 
Short's holding is consistent with Williams. In both 
s~ 
cases, the state had defined the maximum amount of -- -------------------------------------~-incarceration necessary and had imposed a greater period of - -._-




narrow, the opinion adopted the broad reasoning of an earlier 
plurality: 
"[T]he same constitutional defect condemned in 
Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for 
failing to make immediate payment of any fine, 
whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail term 
and whether or not the jail term extends beyond the 
maximum term that may be imposed on a person willing 
and able to pay a fine. In each case, the 
Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine 
as a sentence and then automatically converting it 
into a jail term solely because the defendant is 
indigent and cannot forewith pay the fine in full." 
Id., at 398 (quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 
5 0 8 , 5 0 9 ( 19 7 0) ( pe r cur i am) ) • 
Although Short can be limited to the narrow rationale of 
Uo 
conver~ 
a lump sum fine into a jail term because of inability to pay is ~ 
I I 
Williams, its reasoning suggests that any scheme that 
,, 
-------------~------------------------
constitutionally infirm. It indicates that a state first must ---. __ -------.....__-
seek to use alternative measures, such as installment payments, 
and reserves the question of whether it would be constitutional 
to imprison an indigent defendant when alternative measures 
prove unsuccessful. 
A problem with these opinions is that they do not ~ 
 
, make the proper level of scrutiny clear. Griffin purported to ~ 
~~ 
~
p ly a rational relationship test and found the statute infirm  
~ I~» ecause the state has no interest in depriving an indigent of a ~ 
f . . 1 h' b h 1 b . d' . ~~ ~ ~.  a1r tr1a . T 1s may e t e correct resu t, ut 1t 1sgu1ses Vt the application of a ~tiny. The state 
has an obvious fiscal interest in not paying for _ transcripts 
for indigents, which the statute rationally advanced. What 
Griffin did was to say that the state's interest was not 
sufficient to justify denyiny a class of people, indigents, a 
right as fundamental as a fair~ It applied, as Professor 
Gunther has noted, "rational relationship with bite." -
9' . 
~.t-v >J. 
Williams could be viewed as the application of a ~-- ~~-A~ 
~~--:· 
rational relationship test on the theory th~nce the state's 
interest in incarceration has been satisfied the state has no 
rational basis for imposing a greater period of incarceration 
'-- ~--~~---------------------------------on an indigent defendant. This again slights the state's 
interest in Williams. In that case, the state had determined 
that a person convicted of petty theft could be punished by one 
year in prison ~ a fine. If a defendant has served his one 
year but cannot pay a fine because of his indigency, then the 
state has an interest in exacting that penalty from the 
defendant, which the state rationally could have advanced by 
subjecting the defendant to a corresponding prison term. 
~ 
Indeed, to do otherwise would result in inverse discrimination ~ 
-a rich person who had served his year and paid his fine would 
be subjected to a greater penalty than a poor person. What 
Williams appears to have done was again to have applied 
"heightened scrutiny" and held implicitly that although the 
state's action was rational, it was required to pursue 
alternative courses, such as installment payments. Williams 
did not consider the more difficult question of how the state 
could achieve its interest in punishment if the defendant's 
indigency prevented from meeting his installment payments. In 
this respect, the reasoning in Williams is similar to that in 
Short. 
Although these cases do not explain their heightened 
level of scrutiny, your opinion in San Antonio School District 




their holdings. It 
~-
wealth was a suspect 
classification when two conditions were met. 
I} __ ./} _Uf -""~ ... : ~ j_ ' 
The individuals, or groups of individuals, who ~~~11~ 
constituted the class discriminated against in our 
prior cases shar~_ two distinguishing 
characteristics (J/because of their impecunity they 
were completely unable to pay~or some desired 
benefit, and as a consequenc€J:!they sustained an 
absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to 
enjoy that benefit." Id., at 20. 
Both the generalization drawn in San Antonio School District 
and the previous cases suggest that in this case, the Court 
should apply a heightened level of scrutiny. Although neither 
Williams nor Short el of scrutiny applied, it 
would seem that an level of scrutiny ould be 
consistent with 
B. Whether the State May Require Indigents to Pay Fines 
On finding that petr was guilty, the state did not 
enter judgment or a sentence. Instead, it placed petr on ___ _.... 
probation, conditioned on his payment of a fine and restitution 
over a four month period. On appeal, it has asserted three 
purposes for imprisoning petr for failure to pay the fine and 
restitution. Payment of the fine indicates that the initial 
judgment that he might be rehabilitated was correct; the state 
has an interest in penalizing indigents who cannot pay their 
fines; and the state has an interest in ensuring that victims 
of crime receive some compensation. These interests are 
certainly substantial. Whether the state's means of 
implementing these interests are constitutional depends on the 
level of scrutiny that is applied. 
11. 
If a normal rational relationship test is applied, 
~----------------------------the statute is valid. It is not irrational for the state to ~ 
determine that probationers who do not have the means to repay
their fines demonstrated that they are not likely to be ~~~ 
rehabilitated. Second, imposing a sentence of imprisonment on ~ 
those defendants who do not pay their fines is certainly 
rationally related to the state's interest in punishing 
digent defendants who cannot pay their fines. Finally, it is 
not irrational for the state to suppose that its goal of 
restitution would be furthered by placing indigent probationers 
in jail. The threat of jail may prompt concerned family 
members or friends to volunteer the restitution money, thus 
providing both compensation for the victims and some assurance 
that the probationer's relatives and friends will be involved 
in aiding his rehabilitation. 
Under the heightened level of scrutiny that the Court 
previously has applied to such classifications, however, the 
statute suffers serious difficulties. The particular vice of 
the statute is not that the interests it asserts are not 
substantial. It is that in implementing them it makes 
overbroad generalizations about indigents. The state asserts 
that the failure to pay the fine demonstrates "the likelihood 
that [the probationer] would commit another crime." The state 
might determine that some probationers who lack money may be 
pressured by their financial status to commit further crimes. 
Deciding, however, that the every indigent who is unable to pay 
his fine is likely to be unable to rehabilitate himself sweeps 
"-----
12. 
too broadly. Where, as in this case, the inablity to pay stems 
<... -
from depressed economic conditions, the ind ,igent • s failure to 
pay sheds no light on the probationer's chances for 
rehabilitation. 
Conversely, imposing a fine may excerbate any 
criminal tendencies a probationer has. An indigent defendant 
might be tempted to borrow from "loan sharks," who will charge 
him a high rate of interest and place increased pressure on him 
to repay the loans by any means, legal or illegal. In such 
circumstances, payment of a fine would not indicate successful 
rehabilitation as much as it would show that the probationer 
had sought to purchase his freedom at too high a price. While 
financial information about a defendant's chances for 
rehabilitation are relevant considerations such information is 
best considered on an individualized basis. Determining that 
all indigents pose a poor risk of rehabilitation or that any 
person who pays his fine is a good risk is not substantially 
related to the State's goal. 
The most difficult question involves the second 
interest asserted by the state. Georgia argues that "[i)f 
revocation were not permitted petitioner would escape 
punishment and, because he was sentenced under Georgia's first 
offenders• procedure, even avoid a conviction." Red Brief at 
22. The state certainly has an interest in punishing convicted 
offenders. If an indigent is unable to pay, he should not 
escape the punishment that Georgia lawfully has imposed. It 
~ 
-
might be questioned, however, if 1~utomatic rev6catio;' is 
------------~ 
substantially related to Georgia's interest. -Where the probationer is not withholding payment 
willingly and where there is a clear indication that his 
indigency is temporary, then it would be consistent with the 
1}. 
state's interests to defer payment. The petr states, and resp 
does not disagree, that he was unable to pay his fine because ~ 
 -he was laid off his job. _____ ______....__ If the state were to allow petr to ., 
.L~-0/1 \j defer his payments until he obtained sufficient money to pay 
the fine, the penalty would be no less. As Justice Harlan 
noted in his concurrence to Williams, "the deterrent effect of 
a fine is apt to derive more from its pinch on the purse than 
the time of payment." 
Nor would there be an additional burden on the state. ? 
As part of his probation, state has undertaken to monitor the 
course of petr's rehabilitation. Because the state already has 
committed its resources to keeping track of petr, it will incur ~ 
~f-? 
no additional burden in determining whether petr will be in a 
position to pay the fines. If the state determines that petr 
could pay or never can pay, then it may assert its interest in 
exacting some sort of punishment by incarcerating him. The 
primary effect of applying heightened scrutiny would be to sa 
------ ----- iZ ,l 
that Georgia may not revoke his probation automatically_on 
nonpayment. Georgia can deprive an indigent defendant of his 
~
liberty to exact punishment only after it has determined that 
alternate means will not suffice. This reasoning is implici 
in the analysis used in both Williams and Short. 
,. 
Even if Georgia determines that there is no 
reasonable possibility that petr will repay his fine, then 
14. 
~ 
there is a further problem with the statute. The statute does 
not seek to set equivalent penalties. In this respect, it is --- ....._-~~ 
unlike a statute in which the legislatur~t~cing 
judge has made a determination that incarceration for a week 
~...---"""' 
the equivalent of a $100 fine. Instead, the fine is one of 
several conditions designed to provide a modicum of punishment 
and proof of rehabilitation. Imposing the entire sentence on 
the defendant as an alternative for the punishment embodied in 
the fine is not substantially related to the degree to which 
Georgia seeks to punish petr. 
Finally, revoking probation because the defendant is 
indigent does not advance the state's interest in remedying the ;r~ 
harm done to the victim's of the crime. Although it may 
provide the victims with a moral satisfaction at seeing that 
the cause of their loss has been punished, it does not further 
the state's announced end of compensating them monetarily. 
Indeed, it cuts off both the defendant's obligation and ability 
to repay. Where, as here, there is a possiblity that petr will 
regain a job, the state's ends would be served better by 




1. Williams and Short both indicate that a ·heightened level of 
scrutiny should be applied to statutes that place indigents in 
jail for failing to pay their fines. 
~~ 
2. Although the state's interest in rehabilitating ~ ~ ~ 
probationers is substantial, the payment or non-payment j f a ~ 
fine is not substantially related to the interest. When an ~~~ 
indigent defendant's nonpayment results from depressed economic ~ 
conditions, as was the case here, then his failure to pay does~ 
not reflect any lapse that would suggest he is less likely to ~ 
 
be rehabilitated. ~
3. The state's interest in exacting punishment is - -- ·~· ----... 
/t-V()~ 
substantia~~ 
When, however, there are reasonable, alternate means of 
accomplishing that end without imprisoning the defendant then 
the state must pursue them. If the state decides that 
imprisonment is necessary in this case, then the statute is - ----
still flawed. The period of incarceration imposed by statute ------
~ 
is not related to the state's punitive interest in imposing the 
-----~--------------------------------------------
fine. -
4. Finally, it undercuts, rather than furthers the state's 
interest in compensating the victims to place all indigent 
probationers in jail without determining whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that they will be able to pay 





 c:,_.; ~ .. ~(9 ?· 
~ -(;, :z;lu ~·~t..,.t:-p ~-
~B=EA=R=D~E=N~v~·-G=E=O~R~G~I=A Argued 1/11/83 




w~ { ~~-- /l &-trf cft:V) . 
~{;-~ ~ 






c:ourt ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 










N POST DIS AFF 
MERITS 
REV AFF 
Burger, Ch. J... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ,~ . . . . . . . . . ......... . . 
Brennan, J .................... . V: ....................... . 
V' White, J........... ... ........ . .. 'h ... ; .. ·~ ... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . ... ~~ .. ~ .. . 
Blackmun, J .................. (. j ... . ~ ........... . 
Powell, J ............................................ . 
Rehnquist, J ..................... ·;j'· ............... . 
Stevens, J ................................................... . 






ABSENT NOT VOTING 
' ' 
, . . 
' ' ~ 




,~;. ~~-~----~~~~ ~ 
,,·~~~  F~ y... C-L;'<4,.4C.t~ 
.· ,'~ 13~ ~ad..i  
~:, ~~~(1 
. ·-
No. 81-6633 , __ B~~a~rd~e~n~v~.~G~eo~r~gl~·a~----------~C~on~f~·~l~/~14~/_83 ____ __ 
The Chief Justice ~ 
p~~kt~~~~~~ 
~b1-J . ~~..6--<.~~~ 
PI~.~- 77~~75: 
flJ-~~J~~I-s ~~~-
J,I '' '' ~ ~.&..e ~  
~~~~~~ J.k.-~d-(4~ 
~ ~~~ ~ ~ 4~"""..£ .. 1~ ~~ 
?~~r---~-~- ~·~kv~ 
. ' 
Justice Marshall /(_;£;.. 
Justice Blackmun 7'2i1;: V'JA..) ~ 
~~~-~~~~ 
~ /1~. ,~1-# , 
~~~~4~~-
~~ -
Justice Powell ~ · 
5~~~~, 
'dJ ~1-~ ~~~ 4../Jr.B '11-TM 
' . 
~.-<L...-~ r-'~1.;_#/ ~ ~L.b"f..L Ary' ~ 
~~k~. 
i J 
Justice Rehnquist C!-1f ~ , , 
~/fJ~~~~~. lA./~-~ 
~~~~d-o~~ 
Justice Stevens Je!::r 
~~LF~5~ 
&-I-~ ~~ c/P~~-~~ 
Justice O'Connor ~, 
. ~ 
~ ~ ~ c;....c....~..c...c..t~vr,:~rc..cc~ '\---... 




(Jf'9 ~- -!~~"" ::>~ 
' [ .• -;'.Jl"i ... ~ 




~ _ .------6 A . ~ / Justice Marshall 
Justice Blackmun 
Justice Powell 
~ cy - ;:;- . 
tPj &-Jt.t 5/ ~ ¢- .hj f'? ~-1..:-lu $ j /:> 
~ tn1/ h/ftW">.-V 




From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
/~ ~- 7)tz.?;c-f . . 
~~ tiK.- ~ 7 ~ 4..-j-~ 'q,~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~ ~ ~~ 
(/) fZ~~~~J 
'/f-t0~ ~ LA.- No. 81-6633 ,L_ '-~ ~ . _,.; 7 
{)~~~ 
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/-- 7 d ~: OFGEORGIA ;;7 J~ 
~ ~ju,l -7 ~,AJ.'a~]Cflk -£J 6 -~~J--1~"'1 
cJ- /-JAJf s~ e -..----:-::; ~1 
Memorandum to the Conference. - ~ . (I~~ 
~ W The question in this case is whether the Fourteenth 
1 ; ~' _ _ mendment prohibits a State from revoking an indigent de-L-,./~..,- dant's probation for failure fully to pay a fine and restitu- · 
I /) '-:--- tion. Its resolution involves a delicate balance between the 
115>  acceptability, and indeed wisdom, of considering all relevant 
1 _ ~actors when determining an appropriate sentence for an in-
~ ~dividual and the impermissibility of imprisoning a defendant 
solely because of his lack of financial resources. We con-
- t:; elude, on the record presented here, that the trial court erred 
·1 in automatically revoking probation because petitioner could 
lfi7) _ , not pay his fine. We therefore reverse the judgment of the 
~~ Georgia Court of Appeals upholding the revocation of proba-
- I t9 tion, and remand for a new sentencing determination. 
9_,z_ ~~"~ ~ -/) I 
In September 1980, petitioner was indicted for the felonies 
~ of burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. He 
~A~~ pleaded guilty, and was sentenced on October 8, 1980. Pur-
{/f')V~ _ _ ~., . suant to the Georgia First Offender's Act, Ga. Code. Ann. 
~ §§27-2727 et. seq. (current version at §§42-8-60 et. seq. 
(
.., (~~ Supp.)), the trial court did not enter a judgment of 
~ .. ~iit, but deferred further proceedings and sentenced peti-
{ 
tioner to three years on probation for the burglary charge 
~ ~ and a concurrent one year on probation for the theft charge. 
~- ~'-5 ~Vl./~~.-IZ/1~ 
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As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered petitioner 
to pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution. 1 Petitioner was to 
pay $100 that day, $100 the next day, and the $550 balance 
within four months. 
Petitioner borrowed money from his parents and paid the 
first $200. About a month later, however, petitioner was 
laid off from his job. Petitioner, who has only a n~e 
education and cannot read, tried repeatedly to find other 
work but was unable to do so. The record indicates that pe-
titioner had no income or assets during this period. 
Shortly before the balance of the fine and restitution came 
due in February 1981, petitioner notified the probation office 
he was going to be late with his payment because he could not 
find a job. In May 1981, the State filed a petition in the trial 
court to revoke petitioner's probation because he had not 
paid the balance. 2 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court revoked probation for failure to pay the balance of the 
fine and restitution, 3 entered a conviction and sentenced pe-
1 The trial court ordered a payment of $200 restitution for the theft by 
receiving charge; and ordered payment of $50 in restitution and $500 fine 
for the burglary charge. 
The other conditions of probation prohibited petitioner from leaving the 
jurisdiction of the court without permission, from drinking alcoholic bever-
ages, using or possessing narcotics, or visiting places where alcoholic bev-
erages or narcotics are sold, from keeping company with persons of bad 
reputation, from violating any penal law, and required him to avoid places 
of disreputable character, to work faithfully at suitable employment insofar 
as possible, and to report to the probation officer as directed and to permit 
the probation officer to visit him. 
2 The State's petition alleged two grounds for revoking probation: peti-
tioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution, and an alleged burglary he 
committed on May 10, 1981. The State abandoned the latter ground at the 
hearing to revoke probation, and counsel has informed us that petitioner 
was later acquitted of the charge. Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 1. 
3 The trial court also found that petitioner violated the conditions of pro-
bation by failing to report to his probation officer as directed. Since the 
trial court was unauthorized under state law to revoke probation on a 
ground not stated in the petition, Radcliff v. State, 134 Ga. App. 244, 214 
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titioner to serve the remaining portion of the probationary 
period in prison. 4 The Georgia Court of Appeals, relying on 
earlier Georgia Supreme Court cases, 5 rejected petitioner's 
claim that imprisoning him for inability to pay the fine vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Georgia Supreme Court denied review. Since 
other courts have held that revoking the probation of indi-
gents for failure to pay fines does violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 6 we granted certiorari to resolve this important 
issue in the administration of criminal justice. 458 U. S. 
- (1981). 
II 
This Court has long been sensitive to the treatment of indi-
gents in our criminal justice system. Over a quarter-cen-
tury ago, Justice Black declared that "there can be no equal 
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the 
amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 
19 (1956) (plurality opinion). Griffin's principle of "equal 
justice," which the Court applied there to strike down a state 
practice of granting appellate review only to persons able to 
afford a trial transcript, has been applied in numerous other 
S.E. 2d 179 (1975), the court of appeals upheld the revocation solely on the 
basis of petitioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution. 
'The trial court first sentenced petitioner to five years in prison, with a 
concurrent three-year sentence for the theft conviction. Since the record 
of the initial sentencing hearing failed to reveal that petitioner had been 
warned that a violation of probation could result in a longer prison term 
than the original probationary period, as required by Stevens v. State, 245 
Ga. 835, 268 S.E. 2d 330 (1980), the court reduced the prison term to the 
remainder of the probationary period. 
5 Hunter v. Dean, 240 Ga. 214, 239 S.E. 2d 791 (1977); Calhoun v. 
Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E. 2d 455 (1974). 
'See, e. g., Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F. 2d 726 (CA5 1972); In re Antazo, 
3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P. 2d 999 (1970); State v. Tackett, 52 Haw. 601, 483 P. 2d 
191 (1971); State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A. 2d 137 (1971); State ex 
rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286, 201 N. W. 2d 778 (1972). 
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contexts. See, e. g.,vJJouglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 
(1963) (indigent entitled to counsel on first direct appeal); 
vRoberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967) (indigent entitled to 
free transcript of preliminary hearing for use at trial); 'Mayer 
v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971) (indigent cannot be denied 
an adequate record to appeal a conviction under a fine-only 
statute). Most relevant to the issues here is the holding in 
Vwilliams v. I llinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), that a State cannot 
subjeclaCertarn class of convicted defendants to a period of 
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely because 
they are too poor to pay the fine. Williams was followed 
and extended in Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), which 
held that a State cannot convert a fine imposed under a fine-
only statute into a jail term solely because the defendant is 
indigent and cannot immediately pay the fine in full. :full the 
Court has also reco ·zed limits on the rinci le of rotectmg 
indigents m t e criminal JUstice system. For example, in 
Ross_:T]!l_§.ffitj,, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), we held that indigents 
hadnoconstitutional right to appointed counsel for a dis-
cretionary appeal. In United States v. MacCallum, 426 
U. S. 317 (1976) (plurality opinion), we rejected an equal pro-
tection challenge to a federal statute which permits a district 
court to provide an indigent with a free trial transcript only if 
the court certifies that the challenge to his conviction is not 
frivolous and the transcript is necessary to prepare his 
petition. 
Due process and equal protection principles converge in 
the Court's analysis in these cases. See Griffin v. Illinois, 
supra, at 17. Most decisions in this area have rested on an 
equal protection framework, although Justice Harlan in par-
ticular has insisted that a due process approach more accu-
rately captures the competing concerns. See, e. g., Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 29-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wil-
liams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 259-266 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). As we recognized in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S., 
at 608-609, we generally analyze the fairness of relations be-
81-6633-MEMORANDUM 
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tween the criminal defendant and the State under the Due 
Process Clause, while we approach the question whether the 
State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a sub-
stantial benefit available to another class of defendants under 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
The question presented here is whether a sentencing court ) ~f-&:-
can revoke a defendant's probation for failure to pay the im-
posed fine and restitution, absent evidence and findings that ~ l 
the defendant was somehow res onsible for the failure. The .r~ 4' 
parties, ol owmg t e !§:_mework of i hams and a.te, have H.£_ 
argued the question primarily in te~s of equal protection, q 
and vigorously debate whether strict scrutiny or rational 
basis is the appropriate standard of review. There is no 
doubt that the State has treated the petitioner differently 
from a person who did not fail to pay the imposed fine and 
therefore did not violate probation. To determine whether ~ j,/1 
this differential treatment violates the Equal Protection C-f f/ ~~ 
Clause, one must determine whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, a defendant's indigent status may be considered 
in the decision whether to revoke probation. This is sub-
stantially similar to asking directly the due process question 
of whether it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary for the 
State to revoke probation for failure to pay the fine without 17/ /) ~~ 
inquiry into the reason for the probationer's failure to pay or 
whether alternative punishment is feasible. 7 Whether ana-
7 We have previously applied considerations of procedural and substan-
tive fairness to probation and parole revocation proceedings. In 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), where we established certain 
procedural requirements for parole revocation hearings, we recognized 
that society has an "interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness." 
I d., at 484. We addressed the issue of fundamental fairness more directly 
in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1972), where we held that in certain 
cases "fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require 
that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or 
parolees." !d., at 790. Fundamental fairness, we determined, presump-
tively requires counsel when the probationer claims that "there are sub-
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lyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, 8 the issue 
cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole 
analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such fac-
~s "the nature of the individual mterestarleCte(f,tne ex-
tent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection 
between legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence 
of alternative means for effectuating the purpose .... " 
Williams v. Illinois, supra, at 260 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
In analyzing this issue, of course, we do not write on a 
clean slate, for both Williams and Tate anal zed similar situ-
ations. The reach and 1mits o their o · re vitartO a 
p;:oper resolution of the issue here. In illiams a defend-
ant was sentenced to the maximum prison term and fine au-
thorized under the statute. Because of his indigency he 
could not pay the fine. Pursuant to another statute equating 
a $5 fine with a day in jail, the defendant was kept in jail for 
101 days beyond the maximum prison sentence to "work out" 
the fine. The Court struck down the practice, holding that 
stantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revoca-
tion inappropriate." Ibid. In Douglas v. Buder, 412 U. S. 430 (1973), we 
found a substantive violation of due process when a state court had revoked 
probation with no evidence that the probationer had violated probation. 
Today we address whether a court can revoke probation for failure to pay a 
fine and restitution when there is no evidence that the petitioner was at 
fault in his failure to pay or that alternate means of punishment were 
inadequate. 
8 A due process approach has the advantage in this context of directly 
confronting the intertwined question of the role that a defendant's financial 
background can play in determining an appropriate sentence. When the 
court is initially considering what sentence to impose, a defendant's level of 
financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather than a classification. 
Since indigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classifica-
tion, fitting "the problem of this case into an equal protection framework is 
a task too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished," North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 723 (1969). The more appropriate question is 
whether consideration of a defendant's financial background in setting or 
resetting a sentence is so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due 
process. 
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"[o]nce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration 
necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it 
may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants 
to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum 
solely by reason of their indigency." 399 U. S., at 233--234. 
In Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), we faced a similar situ-
ation, except that the statutory penalty there permitted only 
a fine. Quoting from a concurring opinion in Morris v. 
Schoonfield, 399 U. S. 508, 509 (1970), we reasoned that "the 
same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also in-
heres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate pay-
ment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a 
jail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent ex-
tends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a 
person willing and able to pay a fine." 401 U. S., at 398. 
The rule of Williams and Tate, then, is that the State can- ~ ~ 
not "impos[e a fin;as a sentence and then automatic~con- w~ vl~ 
vert lt into a jm term solely ecause the aefendant is indi- -
gent and cannot forth~_!_h ~~ll!'~ supra, 
at~ros,utheStafe~determines a fine to be '/L_; fi~ ~,/0~ 
the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may lr---~~ 
not thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the ~
resources to pay it. Both Williams and Tate carefully dis-
tinguished this substantive limitation on the imprisonment of 
indigents from the situation where a defendant was at fault in 
failing to pay the fine. As the Court made clear in Williams, 
"nothing in our decision today precludes imprisonment for 
willful refusal to pay a fine or court costs." 399 U. S., at 
242, n. 19. Likewise in Tate, the Court "emphasize[d] that 
ou holding today does not suggest any constitutional infir-
. . in imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a 
fine who refuses or neglects to do so." 401 U. S., at 400. 
This distinction, based on the reasons for non-payment, is 
(~r­
 




jyvO of critical importance here. If the probationer has willfully 
() ~ y refused to pay the fine when he has the means to pay, the 
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tion to enforce collection. See ~' Model Penal _Qode 
§ 302.2(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). S imilarly, a proba-
tioner's failure to make sufficient efforts to seek employment 
or borrow money in order to pay the fine or restitution may 
reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to 
society for his crime. In such a situation, the State is like-
wise justified in revoking probation and using imprisonment 
as an appropriate penalty for the offense. But if the ,pruba-
tio~r has made all r~onable ef:0-rts to pay the fi~, and yet 
cannot do sotfirougn no fault oj hi§_2wn, it is fundamentcilly 
unTair to revoke probatiOrl automatically without attempting 
to employ alterna 1ve methods o punishing the defendant. 
This lack of fault provides a "substantial reaso[n] which justi-
fie[s] or mitigate[s] the violation and make revocation inap-
propriate." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, at 790. 9 Cf. Za-
9 Numerous decisions by state and federal courts have recognized that 
basiclairnessrorl5ids the revocation of probation when the probationer is 
without fault in his failure to pay the fine. For example, in United States 
v. Boswell, 605 F. 2d 171 (CA5 1979), the court distinguished between re-
voking probation where the defendant did not have the resources to pay 
restitution and had no way to acquire them-a revocation the court found 
improper-from revoking probation where the defendant had the re-
sources to pay or had ne ligently or deliberately allowed them to be dissi-
pated in a manner t at resulte m IS ma ihty to pay-an entirely legiti-
mate action by the trial court. Accord, United States v. Taylor, 321 F. 2d 
339 (CA41965); United States v. Wilson, 469 F. 2d 368 (CA2 1972); State v. 
Huggett, 525 P. 2d 1119 (Haw. 1974); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 11&-117, 
473 P. 2d 999, 1007-1009 (1970); Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266 
N. W. 2d 403, 408 (1978). Commentators have similarly distinguished be- ; 
tween the permissibility of revoking probation for contumacious failure to 
pay a fine, and the impermissibility of revoking probation when the proba-
tioner made good-faith efforts to pay. See, e. g., ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice 18-7.4 and Commentary (2d ed. I980) ("mcarceration 
should be employed only after the court has examined the reasons for non-
payment"); ALI, Model Penal Code § 302.2 (distinguishing "contumacious" 
failure to pay fine from "good faith effort" to obtain funds); National Advi-
sory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections 
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blocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 400 (1978) (POWELL, J., 
concurring) (distinguishing, under both due process and 
equal protection analyses, persons who shirk their moral and 
legal obligation to pay child support from those wholly unable 
to pay). 
A probationer who has made adequate bona fide efforts to 
pay his fine and restitution, and who has complied with the 
ot~ <:2_n~it!2E~ti9n, has demonstra e a willingness 
to pay lliS<fehf to soCiety-' and an ability to conform his con-
duct to social norms. The cause of his violation-his indi-
gency-does not by itself endanger the safety or welfare of 
society. The State nevertheless asserts that its penological 
interests require that probation be revoked in such a situa-
tion. Of course, the State has a fundamental interest in ap-
propriately punishing persons-rich and poor-who violate 
its criminal laws. A defe ' o ert in no wa im u-
niz~him fro1}1 _pujli~t. Thus, when determining ini-
tial State's penological interests require impo-
sition of a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court can 
consider the entire background of the defendant, including 
his employment history and financial resources. See Wil-
liams v. New York, 337 U. S. 247, 250, and n. 15 (1949). As 
we said in Williams v. Illinois, "[a]fter having taken into 
consideration the wide range of factors underlying the exer-
cise of his sentencing function, nothing we now hold pre-
cludes a judge from imposing on an indigent, as on any de-
fendant, the maximum penalty prescribed by law." 399 
U. S., at 243. 
The decision to place the defendant on probation, however, 
reflects a determination by the sentencing court that the 
State's penological interests do not require imprisonment. 
See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S., at 264 (Harlan, J., con-
Laws, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act §§ 3-404 (1978). See also 
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curring); Woods v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 286-287 (WHITE, 
J., dissenting). As indicated above, a probationer's failure 
to make reasonable efforts to repay his debt to society may 
indicate that this original determination needs reevaluation, 
and imprisonment may now be required to satisfy the State's 
interests. But if the probationer has made adequate bona 
fide efforts yet cannot pay, the interests asserted by the 
State do not justify imprisonment for that reason alone. 
The State argues that revoking probation furthers its in-
terest in ensuring that restitution be paid to the victims of 
crime. A rule that imprisonment may befall the probationer 
who fails to make adequate bona fide efforts to pay restitu-
tion may indeed spur probationers to try hard to pay, 
thereby increasing the number of probationers who make 
restitution. Such a goal is fully served, however, by revok-
ing probation only for persons who have not made sufficiently 
adequate bona fide efforts. Revoking the probation of some-
one who through no fault of his own is unable to make restitu-
tion will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming. It is 
arbitrary, therefore, to imprison such a probationer in an at-
tempt to ensure restitution under such circumstances. 
More plausibly, the State argues that its interests in pun-
ishing the lawbreaker and deterring others from criminal be-
havior require it to revoke probation for failure to pay a fine 
or restitution. The State clearly has an interest in punish- ~ 
ment and deterrence, but this interest can often be served 
fulll EX. ~lt~~ati~e means. As we saiain WiZlU.iinB; 399 
U. s:-;ar~iterated in Tate, 401 U.S., at 399, "[t]he 
State is not powerless to enforce judgments against those fi-
nancially unable to pay a fine." For example, the sentencing 
court could extend the time for making payments, or reduce 
the fine, or direct that the probationer perform some form of 
labor or public service in lieu of the fine. Justice Harlan ap-
propriately observed in his concurring opinion in Williams 
that "the deterrent effect of a fine is apt to derive more from 
its pinch on the purse than the time of payment." Williams, 
supra, , at 265. Indeed, given the general flexibility of tai-
, . 
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loring fines to the resources of a defendant, or even permit-
ting the defendant to do specified work to satisfy the fine, see 
Williams, 399 U. S., at 244, n. 21, it seems unlikely that a 
sentencing court could not establish a reduced fine or alter-
nate public service in lieu of a fine that adequately serves the 
state's goals of punishment and deterrence, given the defend-
ant's diminished financial resources. Only if the alt~tives 
to imprisonment are not feasible in a particular situation does 
thEEJtate's ~i§.~d aliter reguire it to imru:.ison a 
probationer who has made ade uate bona fide efforts to pay. 
This eaves on y e tate's assertion a 1 s 1 e e in re-
habilitating the probationer and protecting society requires it 
to remove him from the temptation of committing other 
crimes-a naked assertion that a probationer's poverty by it-
self indicates he may commit crimes in the future and thus 
that society needs for him to be incapacitated. We have al-
ready indicated that a sentencing court can consider a de-
fendant's employment history and financial resources in set-
ting an initial punishment. Such considerations are a 
necessary part of evaluating the entire background of the de-
fendant in order to tailor an appropriate sentence for the de-
fendant and crime. But it must remembered that the State 
is seeking here to use as the sole justification for imprison-
ment the poverty of a probationer who, by assumption, has 
demonstrated adequate bona fide efforts to find a job and pay 
the fine and whom the State initially thought it unnecessary 
to imprison. Given the significant interest of the individual 
in remaining on probation, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U. S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), 
it is fundamentally unfair for the State to incarcerate a proba-
tioner who has demonstrated adequate bona fide efforts to 
repay his debt to society, solely by lumping him together 
with other poor persons and thereby classifying him as dan-
gerous. 10 This would be little more than punishing a person 
for his poverty. 
10 The State emphasizes several empirical studies suggesting a correla-
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We do not suggest that, in other contexts, the probation-
er's lack of fault in violating a term of probation prevents a 
court from revoking probation. For instance, a common con-
dition of probation for a person convicted of a drug or alcohol 
offense is that he receive rehabilitative treatment. Cer-
tainly, the sentencing court is justified in determining that 
society's need for protection requires that a criminal defend-
ant with an uncured drug or alcohol addiction be incarcer-
ated. See, e. g., United States v. Manfredonia, 341 F. 
Supp. 790, 794, and n. 6 (SDNY), aff'd, 459 F. 2d 1392 (CA2 
1972). Humphrey v. State, 428 A. 2d 440, 444 (Md. Ct. App. 
1981) (Rodowsky, J., diss.); Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U. 8. 
514 (1968). Indeed, it may be reckless for a court to permit a 
person convicted of driving while intoxicated, for example, to 
remain on probation once it becomes evident that efforts at 
controlling his public drunkenness have failed. Ultimately, 1 
it must be remembered that the sentence was not imposed 
for a circumstance beyond the probationer's control "but be-
cause he had committed a crime." Williams, supra, at 242. 
In contrast to a condition like chronic drunken driving, how-
ever, the condition at issue here-indigency-is itself no 
threat to the safety or welfare of society. 
We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for fail-
ure topay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must in-
quire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the proba-
tioner willfully refused to pay or failed to make adequate 
bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the 
court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to 
imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing 
authority. If the probationer could not pay despite adequate 
bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court 
must consider alternate measures of punishment other than 
imprisonment. Only if alternate measure~ are not feasible 
~----------- ~ > 
tion between poverty and crime. E . g., Green, Race, Social Status, and 
Criminal Arrest, 35 Amer. Soc. Rev. 476 (1978); M. Wolfgang, R. Figlio, 
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may the court imprison a probationer who has made adequate 
bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the 
probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, 
through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a 
deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental fairness re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
III 
We return to the facts of this case. At the parole revoca-
tion hearing, the petitioner and his wife testified about their 
lack of income and assets and of his repeated efforts to obtain 
work. While the sentencing court commented on the avail-
ability of odd jobs such as lawn-mowing, it made no finding 
that the petitioner had not made adequate bona fide efforts to 
find work, and the record as it presently stands would not 
justify such a finding. This lack of findings is understand-
able, of course, for under the rulings of the Georgia Supreme 
Court 11 such an inquiry would have been irrelevant to the 
constitutionality of revoking probation. The State argues 
that the sentencing court determined that the petitioner was 
no longer a good probation risk. In the absence of a deter-
mination that the petitioner did not make adequate bona fide 
efforts to pay or to obtain employment in order to pay, we 
cannot read the opinion of the sentencing court as reflecting 
such a finding. Instead, the court curtly rejected counsel's 
suggestion that the time for making the payments be ex-
tended, saying that "the fallacy in that argument" is that the 
petitioner has long known he had to pay the $550 and yet did 
not comply with the court's prior order to pay. App. 45. 
The court declared that "I don't know any way to enforce the 
prior orders of the Court but one way," which was to sen-
tence him to imprisonment. Ibid. 
The focus of the court's concern, then, was that the peti-
tioner had disobeyed a prior court order to pay the fine, and 
for that reason must be imprisoned. But this is no more 
11 See cases cited at n. 5, supra . 
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than imprisoning a person solely because he lacks funds to 
pay the fine, a practice we condemned in Williams and Tate. 
By sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he 
could not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for 
the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or 
extending the time for payments or making alternative or-
ders, the court automatically turned a fine into a prison 
sentence. 
We do not suggest by our analysis of the present record / 
that the State may not place the petitioner in prison. If, t 
upon remand, the Georgia courts determine that petitioner 
did not make adequate bona fide efforts to pay his fine, or de- \ 
termine that alternate punishment is not feasible, imprison-
ment would be a permissible sentence. Unless such deter-
minations are made, however, fundamental fairness requires 
that the petitioner remain on probation. 
IV 
The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for fur~ 
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
drk 04/29/83 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 81-6633, Bearden v. Georgia 
Justice O'Connor has circulated a memorandum opinion ~in 
this case because her arguments for reversing have departed from 
those she expressed at conference. Instead of relying on an equal 
tl ~ 
protection_a~is, she adopts the atl€ process analysis advanced by 
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Williams v. Illinois, 
399 u.s. 235, 259-266 (1970). As I read her opinion, she holds that 
once a State has determined that its penological interests are 
satisfied by placing a convicted defendant on probation rather than 
putting him in prison, it may revoke his probation for not paying 
his fine only in two situations: (i) when his failure to pay his 
fine reflects a willful refusal to do so; and (ii) when no 
alternative means exist for exacting the fine. Thus, whenever a 
defendant is making good faith attempts to pay, the State must 
consider alternative measures such as extending the time for pa 
or allowing the defendant to "work off the fine" by performing 
community service. 
Although I had suggested in my bench memo adopting an 
approach not dissimilar from Justice O'Connors, I am troubled on 
• • ,,I· 
... 
'• 
intrusion on a trial judge's discretion, as I would imagine that 
-----------.......--~ there always will be alternatives to prison that a trial judge might 
consider. I am inclined to agree with the disposition that you ____. 
proposed initially of going off on the narrower ground that the 
If 













From: Justice O'Connor 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 0--
4~ Nos. 82-185, 82-246 AND 82-259 
BOSTON FIREFIGHTERS UNION, LOCAL 718, ~ .4--
PETITIONER ., 
82-185 v. 
BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP, ET AL. 
BOSTON POLICE PATROLMEN'S ASSOCIATION, 
INC., PETITIONER 
82-246 v. 
PEDRO CASTRO ET AL. 
NANCY B. BEECHER, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
82-259 v. 
BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP, ET AL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF .J. 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 1'-f-
[May -, 1983] 
PER CURIAM. 
In these cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit upheld the District Court's August 7, 1981 or-
ders enjoining the Boston Police and Fire Departments from 
laying off policemen and firefighters in a manner that would 
reduce the percentage of minority officers below the level ob-
taining at the commencement of layoffs in July, 1981. 679 F. 
2d 965 (1982). These orders had the effect of partially super-
seding the operation of the state's statutory last-hired, first-
fired scheme for civil service layoffs, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 
' . 
82-185, 82-246 & 82-259-PER CURIAM 
2 FIREFIGHTERS v. BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP 
ch. 31, § 39. Following the Court of Appeals' decision, 
Massachusetts enacted legislation providing the City of Bos-
ton with new revenues, requiring reinstatement of all police 
and firefighters laid off during the reductions in force, secur-
ing these personnel against future layoffs for fiscal reasons, 
and requiring the maintenance of minimum staffing levels in 
the police and fire departments through June 30, 1983. See 
1982 Mass. Acts, c. 190, § 25. In light of these changed cir-
cumstances, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
and remand for consideration of mootness in light of 1982 
Mass. Acts, c. 190, § 25. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of these cases. 
1'4av 2, ;1.983 
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.,. 
Dear San,~ra: 
, Although therr.o is JT'IUch in your thoughtful memot'an-
dum with which I aqree, ! de h?.v~ reservations. 
I wou1d Prefer to necide this ca~e on its facts. 
As you recognize, the state interest in enforcing the crimi-
nal law is substantial, but he~e peittinner was 1~il~d ~or 
two-and-a-half years for faiJure - appar~ntly due to hi~ 
i~~igencv - to pay a $550 fine. In my view, this w~q a de-
nial nf equaJ Protection. ~here is not even a rough equiva-
lence h~twePn the fine an~ jail sentence. The Georgia court 
seemed to think that revocation and iail inq wPre automatic, 
requir.inq no weiqhing - a~ vou suqoP.st ~boule have> been done 
- of relevant facts and circumstances. 
But surely brnad sentencinq ~i~crhtion should be 
1eft n thP t,..ia, courts. J\nd rPquirinq a tria1 indge to 
resort first to alternat i.ves other than jc:d 1, as vour op~ n-
ion "'·oulc, mav 0epr ive 1" iJI" of the di. scr~t ion necessarv to 
effective sentencing. Subject to further consideration, I 
have thouaht that the facts in thi~ case dn rot r~quire us 
to hold that in effect a trial jurlge's diRcretion may nevPr 
inclu~e the right to jail ~ orobation violatcr for somP rP-a-
F>onab, e peri.od. Assume, for PxamoJ e, that Bearden had com-
mitted one or more offenses of p~tty violence. It ~eemn 
doubtful that th~ legitimate state intere~t would b~ served 
bv the alternative vou sugge~t C'lf some public work or 
service. Yet, probation mav have bPPn thouqht a fatr rigk 
ini.tin11v." 
T a1go am concernef!, u: our oPinion qoes too fat', 
that it will DPr~uadP ju~qes and prosecutors to bP far less 
willing to nlacP onP cnnvicted of crime on probation. 





















JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~up-rtm:.t C!fourt o-f tqt ~ttitt~ ,i;hdts 
2Jzu;!rittgtou:. !B. C!f. 2.ll§J!..;l 
Re: No. 81-6633 - Bearden v. Georgia 
De ar Sandra: 
May 2, 198 · 
I could -~ and would -- join an opinion structured 
along the lines of your memorandum circulated April 28. I 
may have one suggestion, but apart from that your memorandum 
appears to me to present an acceptable solution for this 













JUSTICE W>< . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~nprmu Qfcurlcf flrt ~ti:tdt .itait.tr 
~MJring±Lttt, ~. <!f. 20c?Jt~ 
May 3, 1983 
Re: No. 81-6633 
Bearden v. Georgia 
Dear Sandra, 
I would be happy to join an opinion 
along the lines of your memorandum. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM B ERS OF' 
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Should your Memorandum become an opinion, 
concurrence along the following lines: \ · 
JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment. 
We deal here with the recurring situation where a persbn is 
convicted under a statute that authorizes fines or imprisonm~nt 
or both, as well as probation. The defendant is then fined ahd 
placed on probation, one of the conditions of which is that he 
pay the fine and make restitution. In such a situation, the 
Court takes as a given that the state has decided that 
imprisonment is inappropriate because it is unnecessary to 
achieve its penal objectives. But that is true only if the 
defendant pays the fine and makes restitution and thereby suffers 
the financial penalty that such payment entails. Had: the 
sentencing judge been quite sure that the defendant could not pay 
the fine, I cannot believe that the court would not have imposed 
some jail time or that either the Due Process or Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution would prevent such imposition. 
Poverty does not insulate those who break the law from 
punishment. When probation is revoked for failure to pay a fine, 
I find nothing in the Constitution to prevent the trial court 
from revoking probation and imposing a term of imprisonment if 
revocation does not @ u omatically result in the imposition of a 
long jail term and i but the sentencing court makes a good-faith ? 
effort to impose a Jal sentence · that in terms of the state's 
sentencing objectives will be roughly equivalent to the fine and 
restitution that the defendant ( failed to pay. See Wood v. 
Georgia, 450 u.s. 261, 284-287 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Even if 
as a constitutional matter, the ~entencing court should consider 
f I 
:r~-h·c..a... w~.c....'~ ~~~ A.JI.P -..s 
,.,.,~ ~ fa-~ ~ ~--~~ -
~"'""~la. C)·~~ ·~ .~~~~ . ~ 
 7" ) ~J -:T,c.-1-·~ (..)~~·~ 
alternatives short of imprisonment, I would not think the court 
would be required actually to try them if it believes that they 
would not be equivalent in terms of the state's penal objectives 
to the fine and restitution that had been conditions of 
probation. 
In this case, however, the state court did not appear to 
find that the prison term improved was "a rational and necessary 
trade-off to punish the individual who possessed no accumulated 
assets", Wilkins v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 265 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. 
Sincerely, '. 
~y<'\. ' \ 
Justice O'Connor 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-6633 
DANNY R. BEARDEN, PETITIONER v. GEORGIA 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
GEORGIA 
[May -, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits a State from revoking an indigent de-
fendant's probation for failure to pay a fine and restitution. 
Its resolution involves a delicate balance between the accept-
ability, and indeed wisdom, of considering all relevant factors 
when determining an appropriate sentence for an individual 
and the impermissibility of imprisoning a defendant solely be-
cause of his lack of financial resources. We conclude that the 
trial court erred in automatically revoking probation because 
petitioner could not pay his fine, without determining that J 
petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or 
that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist. 
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Georgia Court of 
Appeals upholding the revocation of probation, and remand 
for a new sentencing determination. 
I 
In September 1980, petitioner was indicted for the felonies 
of burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. He 
pleaded guilty, and was sentenced on October 8, 1980. Pur-
suant to the Georgia First Offender's Act, Ga. Code. Ann. 
§§ 27-2727 et seq. (current version at §§ 42-8-60 et seq. (1982 
Supp.)), the trial court did not enter a judgment of guilt, but 
deferred further proceedings and sentenced petitioner to 
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three years on probation for the burglary charge and a con-
current one year on probation for the theft charge. As a 
condition of probation, the trial court ordered petitioner to 
pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution. 1 Petitioner was to 
pay $100 that day, $100 the next day, and the $550 balance 
within four months. 
Petitioner borrowed money from his parents and paid the 
first $200. About a month later, however, petitioner was 
laid off from his job. Petitioner, who has only a ninth grade 
education and cannot read, tried repeatedly to find other 
work but was unable to do so. The record indicates that pe-
titioner had no income or assets during this period. 
Shortly before the balance of the fine and restitution came 
due in February 1981, petitioner notified the probation office 
he was going to be late with his payment because he could not 
find a job. In May 1981, the State filed a petition in the trial 
court to revoke petitioner's probation because he had not 
paid the balance. 2 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court revoked probation for failure to pay the balance of the 
fine and restitution, 3 entered a conviction and sentenced pe-
1 The trial court ordered a payment of $200 restitution for the theft by 
receiving charge; and ordered payment of $50 in restitution and $500 fine 
for the burglary charge. 
The other conditions of probation prohibited petitioner from leaving the 
jurisdiction of the court without permission, from drinking alcoholic bever-
ages, using or possessing narcotics, or visiting places where alcoholic bev-
erages or narcotics are sold, from keeping company with persons of bad 
reputation, from violating any penal law; and required him to avoid places 
of disreputable character, to work faithfully at suitable employment insofar 
as possible, and to report to the probation officer as directed and to permit 
the probation officer to visit him. 
2 The State's petition alleged two grounds for revoking probation: peti-
tioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution, and an alleged burglary he 
committed on May 10, 1981. The State abandoned the latter ground at the 
hearing to revoke probation, and counsel has informed us that petitioner 
was later acquitted of the charge. Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 1. 
3 The trial court also found that petitioner violated the conditions of pro-
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titioner to serve the remaining portion of the probationary 
period in prison. 4 The Georgia Court of Appeals, relying on 
earlier Georgia Supreme Court cases, 5 rejected petitioner's 
claim that imprisoning him for inability to pay the fine vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Georgia Supreme Court denied review. Since 
other courts have held that revoking the probation of indi-
gents for failure to pay fines does violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 6 we granted certiorari to resolve this important 
issue in the administration of criminal justice. 458 U. S. 
- (1981). 
II 
This Court has long been sensitive to the treatment of indi-
gents in our criminal justice system. Over a quarter-cen-
tury ago, Justice Black declared that "there can be no equal 
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the 
amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 
19 (1956) (plurality opinion). Griffin's principle of "equal 
justice," which the Court applied there to strike down a state 
bation by failing to report to his probation officer as directed. Since the 
trial court was unauthorized under state law to revoke probation on a 
ground not stated in the petition, Radcliff v. State, 134 Ga. App. 244, 214 
S.E. 2d 179 (1975), the court of appeals upheld the revocation solely on the 
basis of petitioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution. 
'The trial court first sentenced petitioner to five years in prison, with a 
concurrent three-year sentence for the theft conviction. Since the record 
of the initial sentencing hearing failed to reveal that petitioner had been 
warned that a violation of probation could result in a longer prison tenn 
than the original probationary period, as required by Stevens v. State, 245 
Ga. 835, 268 S.E. 2d 330 (1980), the court reduced the prison tenn to the 
remainder of the probationary period. 
5 Hunter v. Dean, 240 Ga. 214, 239 S.E. 2d 791 (1977); Calhoun v. 
Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E. 2d 455 (1974). 
•see, e. g., Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F. 2d 726 (CA5 1972); In re Antazo, 
3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P. 2d 999 (1970); State v. Tackett, 52 Haw. 601, 483 P. 2d 
191 (1971); State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A. 2d 137 (1971); State ex 
rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286, 201 N. W. 2d 778 (1972). 
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practice of granting appellate review only to persons able to 
afford a trial transcript, has been applied in numerous other 
contexts. See, e. g., Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 
(1963) (indigent entitled to counsel on first direct appeal); 
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967) (indigent entitled to 
free transcript of preliminary hearing for use at trial); Mayer 
v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971) (indigent cannot be denied 
an adequate record to appeal a conviction under a fine-only 
statute). Most relevant to the issue here is the holding in 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), that a State cannot 
subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of 
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely because 
they are too poor to pay the fine. Williams was followed 
and extended in Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), which 
held that a State cannot convert a fine imposed under a fine-
only statute into a jail term solely because the defendant is 
indigent and cannot immediately pay the fine in full. But the 
Court has also recognized limits on the principle of protecting 
indigents in the criminal justice system. For example, in 
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), we held that indigents 
had no constitutional right to appointed counsel for a dis-
cretionary appeal. In United States v. MacCallum, 426 
U. S. 317 (1976) (plurality opinion), we rejected an equal pro-
tection challenge to a federal statute which permits a district 
court to provide an indigent with a free trial transcript only if 
the court certifies that the challenge to his conviction is not 
frivolous and the transcript is necessary to prepare his 
petition. 
Due process and equal protection principles converge in 
the Court's analysis in these cases. See Griffin v. Illinois, 
supra, at 17. Most decisions in this area have rested on an 
equal protection framework, although Justice Harlan in par-
ticular has insisted that a due process approach more accu-
rately captures the competing concerns. See, e. g., Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 29-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wil-
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liams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 259-266 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). As we recognized in Ross v. M ofjitt, 417 U. S., 
at 608-609, we generally analyze the fairness of relations be-
tween the criminal defendant and the State under the Due 
Process Clause, while we approach the question whether the 
State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a sub-
stantial benefit available to another class of defendants under 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
The question presented here is whether a sentencing court 
can revoke a defendant's probation for failure to pay the im-
posed fine and restitution, absent evidence and findings that 
the defendant was somehow responsible for the failure or 
that alternative forms of punishment were inadequate. The 
parties, following the framework of Williams and Tate, have 
argued the question primarily in terms of equal protection, 
and debate vigorously whether strict scrutiny or rational 
basis is the appropriate standard of review. There is no 
doubt that the State has treated the petitioner differently 
from a person who did not fail to pay the imposed fine and 
therefore did not violate probation. To determine whether 
this differential treatment violates the Equal Protection 
Clause, one must determine whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, a defendant's indigent status may be considered 
in the decision whether to revoke probation. This is sub-
stantially similar to asking directly the due process question 
of whether and when it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary 
for the State to revoke probation when an indigent is unable 
to pay the fine. 7 Whether analyzed in terms of equal protec-
7 We have previously applied considerations of procedural and substan-
tive fairness to probation and parole revocation proceedings. In M or-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), where we established certain proce-
dural requirements for parole revocation hearings, we recognized that 
society has an "interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness." I d., at 
484. We addressed the issue of fundamental fairness more directly in 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1972), where we held that in certain 
cases "fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require 
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tion or due process, 8 the issue cannot be resolved by resort to 
easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a 
careful inquiry into such factors as "the nature of the individ-
ual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the 
rationality of the connection between legislative means and 
purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectu-
ating the purpose .... " Williams v. Illinois, supra, at 260 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
In analyzing this issue, of course, we do not write on a 
clean slate, for both Williams and Tate analyzed similar situ-
ations. The reach and limits of their holdings are vital to a 
proper resolution of the issue here. In Williams, a defend-
ant was sentenced to the maximum prison term and fine au-
thorized under the statute. Because of his indigency he 
could not pay the fine. Pursuant to another statute equating 
a $5 fine with a day in jail, the defendant was kept in jail for 
that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or 
parolees." Id., at 790. Fundamental fairness, we determined, presump-
tively requires counsel when the probationer claims that "there are sub-
stantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revoca-
tion inappropriate." Ibid. In Douglas v. Buder, 412 U. S. 430 (1973), we 
found a substantive violation of due process when a state court had revoked 
probation with no evidence that the probationer had violated probation. 
Today we address whether a court can revoke probation for failure to pay a 
fine and restitution when there is no evidence that the petitioner was at 
fault in his failure to pay or that alternate means of punishment were 
inadequate. 
8 A due process approach has the advantage in this context of directly 
confronting the intertwined question of the role that a defendant's financial 
background can play in determining an appropriate sentence. When the 
court is initially considering what sentence to impose, a defendant's level of 
financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather than a classification. 
Since indigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classifica-
tion, fitting "the problem of this case into an equal protection framework is 
a task too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished," North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 723 (1969). The more appropriate question is 
whether consideration of a defendant's financial background in setting or 
resetting a sentence is so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due 
process. 
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101 days beyond the maximum prison sentence to "work out" 
the fine. The Court struck down the practice, holding that 
"[o]nce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration 
necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it 
may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants 
to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum 
solely by reason of their indigency." 399 U. S., at 233-234. 
In Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), we faced a similar situ-
ation, except that the statutory penalty there permitted only 
a fine. Quoting from a concurring opinion in Morris v. 
Schoonfield, 399 U. S. 508, 509 (1970), we reasoned that "the 
same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also in-
heres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate pay-
ment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a 
jail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent ex-
tends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a 
person willing and able to pay a fine." 401 U. S., at 398. 
The rule of Williams and Tate, then, is that the State can-
not "impos[e] a fine as a sentence and then automatically con-
ver[t] it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indi-
gent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full." Tate, supra, 
at 398. In other words, if the State determines a fine to be 
the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may 
not thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the 
resources to pay it. Both Williams and Tate carefully dis-
tinguished this substantive limitation on the imprisonment of 
indigents from the situation where a defendant was at fault in 
failing to pay the fine. As the Court made clear in Williams, 
"nothing in our decision today precludes imprisonment for 
willful refusal to pay a fine or court costs." 399 U. S., at 
242, n. 19. Likewise in Tate, the Court "emphasize[d] that 
our holding today does not suggest any constitutional infir-
mity in imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a 
fine who refuses or neglects to do so." 401 U. S., at 400. 
This distinction, based on the reasons for non-payment, is 
of critical importance here. If the probationer has willfully 
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refused to pay the fine when he has the means to pay, the 
State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanc-
tion to enforce collection. See ALI, Model Penal Code 
§ 302.2(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Similarly, a proba-
tioner's failure to make sufficient efforts to seek employment 
or borrow money in order to pay the fine or restitution may 
reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to 
society for his crime. In such a situation, the State is like-
wise justified in revoking probation and using imprisonment 
as an appropriate penalty for the offense. But if the proba-
tioner has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine, and yet 
cannot do so through no fault of his own, 9 it is fundamentally 
unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering J 
whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the de-
fendant are available. This lack of fault provides a "substan-
tial reaso[n] which justifie[s] or mitigate[s] the violation and 
make revocation inappropriate." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
supra, at 790. 10 Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 400 
9 We do not suggest that, in other contexts, the probationer's lack of 
fault in violating a term of probation would necessarily prevent a court 
from revoking probation. For instance, it may indeed be reckless for a 
court to permit a person convicted of driving while intoxicated to remain on 
probation once it becomes evident that efforts at controlling his chronic 
drunken driving have failed. Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968); 
Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962). Ultimately, it must be re-
membered that the sentence was not imposed for a circumstance beyond 
the probationer's control "but because he had committed a crime." Wil-
liams, supra, at 242. In contrast to a condition like chronic drunken driv-
ing, however, the condition at issue here--indigency-is itself no threat to 
the safety or welfare of society. 
10 Numerous decisions by state and federal courts have recognized that 
basic fairness forbids the revocation of probation when the probationer is 
without fault in his failure to pay the fine. For example, in United States 
v. Boswell, 605 F. 2d 171 (CA5 1979), the court distinguished between re-
voking probation where the defendant did not have the resources to pay 
restitution and had no way to acquire them-a revocation the court found 
improper-from revoking probation where the defendant had the re-
sources to pay or had negligently or deliberately allowed them to be dissi-
pated in a manner that resulted in his inability to pay-an entirely legiti-
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(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) (distinguishing, under both 
due process and equal protection analyses, persons who shirk 
their moral and legal obligation to pay child support from 
those wholly unable to pay). 
The State, of course, has a fundamental interest in appro-
priately punishing persons-rich and poor-who violate its 
criminal laws. A defendant's poverty in no way immunizes 
him from punishment. Thus, when determining initially 
whether the State's penological interests require imposition 
of a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court can consider 
the entire background of the defendant, including his employ-
ment history and financial resources. See Williams v. New 
York, 337 U. S. 247, 250, and n. 15 (1949). As we said in 
Williams v. Illinois, "[a]fter having taken into consideration 
the wide range of factors underlying the exercise of his sen-
tencing function, nothing we now hold precludes a judge from 
imposing on an indigent, as on any defendant, the maximum 
penalty prescribed by law." 399 U. S., at 243. 
The decision to place the defendant on probation, however, 
reflects a determination by the sentencing court that the 
State's penological interests do not require imprisonment. 
mate action by the trial court. Accord, United States v. Taylor, 321 F. 2d 
339 (CA4 1965); United States v. Wilson, 469 F. 2d 368 (CA2 1972); State v. 
Huggett, 525 P. 2d 1119 (Haw. 1974); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 115-117, 
473 P. 2d 999, 1007-1009 (1970); Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266 
N. W. 2d 403, 408 (1978). Commentators have similarly distinguished be-
tween the permissibility of revoking probation for contumacious failure to 
pay a fine, and the impermissibility of revoking probation when the proba-
tioner made good-faith efforts to pay. See, e. g., ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice 18-7.4 and Commentary (2d ed. 1980) ("incarceration 
should be employed only after the court has examined the reasons for non-
payment"); ALI, Model Penal Code § 302.2 (distinguishing "contumacious" 
failure to pay fine from "good faith effort" to obtain funds); National Advi-
sory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections 
§ 5.5 (1973); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act§§ 3-403, 3-404 (1978). See 
also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 1304; Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, 
~ 1005-6--4(d). 
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See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S., at 264 (Harlan, J., con-
curring); Woods v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 286-287 (WHITE, 
J., dissenting). A probationer's failure to make reasonable 
efforts to repay his debt to society may indicate that this 
original determination needs reevaluation, and imprisonment 
may now be required to satisfy the State's interests. But a 
probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay 
his fine and restitution, and who has complied with the other 
conditions of probation, has demonstrated a willingness to 
pay his debt to society and an ability to conform his conduct 
to social norms. The State nevertheless asserts three rea-
sons why imprisonment is required to further its penal goals. 
First, the State argues that revoking probation furthers its 
interest in ensuring that restitution be paid to the victims of 
crime. A rule that imprisonment may befall the probationer 
who fails to make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay restitu-
tion may indeed spur probationers to try hard to pay, 
thereby increasing the number of probationers who make 
restitution. Such a goal is fully served, however, by revok-
ing probation only for persons who have not made sufficient 
bona fide efforts to pay. Revoking the probation of someone 
who through no fault of his own is unable to make restitution 
will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming. Indeed, I 
such a policy may have the perverse effect of inducing the 
probationer to use illegal means to acquire funds to pay in 
order to avoid revocation. 
Second, the State asserts that its interest in rehabilitating -J ·~ c). ilL .! :;? ~ 
the probationer and protecting society requires it to remove r'<J'Y./7 
him from the temptation of committing other crimes. This is 
no more than a naked assertion that a probationer's poverty 
by itself indicates he may commit crimes in the future and 
thus that society needs for him to be incapacitated. We have 
already indicated that a sentencing court can consider a 
defendant's employment history and financial resources in 
setting an initial punishment. Such considerations are a nec-
essary part of evaluating the entire background of the de-
81-6633-0PINION 
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fendant in order to tailor an appropriate sentence for the de-
fendant and crime. But it must remembered that the State 
is seeking here to use as the sole justification for imprison-
ment the poverty of a probationer who, by assumption, has 
demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to find a job and pay 
the fine and whom the State initially thought it unnecessary 
to imprison. Given the significant interest of the individual 
in remaining on probation, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U. S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), 
the State cannot justify incarcerating a probationer who has 
demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his debt to 
society, solely by lumping him together with other poor per-
sons and thereby classifying him as dangerous. 11 This would 
be little more than punishing a person for his poverty. 
Third, and most plausibly, the State argues that its inter-
ests in punishing the lawbreaker and deterring others from 
criminal behavior require it to revoke probation for failure to 
pay a fine or restitution. The State clearly has an interest in 
punishment and deterrence, but this interest can often be 
served fully by alternative means. As we said in Williams, 
399 U. S., at 244, and reiterated in Tate, 401 U. S., at 399, 
"[t]he State is not powerless to enforce judgments against 
those financially unable to pay a fine." For example, the 
sentencing court could extend the time for making payments, 
or reduce the fine, or direct that the probationer perform 
some form of labor or public service in lieu of the fine. Jus-
tice Harlan appropriately observed in his concurring opinion 
in Williams that "the deterrent effect of a fine is apt to de-
rive more from its pinch on the purse than the time of pay-
ment." Ibid., at 265. Indeed, given the general flexibility 
of tailoring fines to the resources of a defendant, or even per-
11 The State emphasizes several empirical studies suggesting a correla-
tion between poverty and crime. E. g., Green, Race, Social Status, and 
Criminal Arrest, 35 Amer. Soc. Rev. 476 (1978); M. Wolfgang, R. Figlio, 
& T. Sellin, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort (1972). 
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mitting the defendant to do specified work to satisfy the fine, 
see Williams, supra, at 244, n. 21, it....s.eQm~ a sentencing 
court can often establish a reduced fine or alternate public 
service in lieu of a fine that adequately serves the State's 
goals of punishment and deterrence, given the defendant's di-
minished financial resources. Only if the sentencing court 
determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not ade-
quate in a particular situation to meet the State's interest in 
punishment and deterrence may the State imprison a proba-
tioner who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. ~ 
We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for fail-
ure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must in-
quire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the proba-
tioner willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient J 
bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the 
court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to 
imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing 
authority. If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient J 
bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court 
must consider alternate measures of punishment other than 
imprisonment. Only if alternate measures are not adequate I 
to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence 
may the court imprison a probationer who has made suffi-
cient bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would de-
prive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply be-
cause, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. 
Such a deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental 
fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
III 
We return to the facts of this case. At the parole revoca-
tion hearing, the petitioner and his wife testified about their 
lack of income and assets and of his repeated efforts to obtain 
work. While the sentencing court commented on the avail-
ability of odd jobs such as lawn-mowing, it made no finding 
81-6633-0PINION 
BEARDEN v. GEORGIA 13 
that the petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to 
find work, and the record as it presently stands would not 
justify such a finding. This lack of findings is understand-
able, of course, for under the rulings of the Georgia Supreme 
Court 12 such an inquiry would have been irrelevant to the 
constitutionality of revoking probation. The State argues 
that the sentencing court determined that the petitioner was 
no longer a good probation risk. In the absence of a deter-
mination that the petitioner did not make sufficient bona fide 
efforts to pay or to obtain employment in order to pay, we 
cannot read the opinion of the sentencing court as reflecting 
such a finding. Instead, the court curtly rejected counsel's 
suggestion that the time for making the payments be ex-
tended, saying that "the fallacy in that argument" is that the 
petitioner has long known he had to pay the $550 and yet did 
not comply with the court's prior order to pay. App. 45. 
The court declared that "I don't know any way to enforce the 
prior orders of the Court but one way," which was to sen-
tence him to imprisonment. Ibid. 
The focus of the court's concern, then, was that the peti-
tioner had disobeyed a prior court order to pay the fine, and 
for that reason must be imprisoned. But this is no more 
than imprisoning a person solely because he lacks funds to 
pay the fine, a practice we condemned in Williams and Tate. 
By sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he 
could not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for 
the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or 
extending the time for payments or making alternative or-
ders, the court automatically turned a fine into a prison 
sentence. 
We do not suggest by our analysis of the present record 
that the State may not place the petitioner in prison. If, 
upon remand, the Georgia co1,1rts determine that petitioner 
did not make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay his fine, or de-
'
2 See cases cited at n. 5, supra. 
....... 
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termine that alternate punishment is not adequate to meet 
the State's interests in punishment and deterrence, imprison-
ment would be a permissible sentence. Unless such deter-
minations are made, however, fundamental fairness requires 
that the petitioner remain on probation. 
IV 
The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-6633 
DANNY R. BEARDEN, PETITIONER v. GEORGIA 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF GEORGIA 
[May -, 1983] 
JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment. 
We deal here with the recurring situation where a person 
is convicted under a statute that authorizes fines or imprison-
ment or both, as well as probation. The defendant is then 
fined and placed on probation, one of the conditions of which 
is that he pay the fine and make restitution. In such a situa-
tion, the Court takes as a given that the state has decided 
that imprisonment is inappropriate because it is unnecessary 
to achieve its penal objectives. But that is true only if the 
defendant pays the fine and makes restitution and thereby 
suffers the financial penalty that such payment entails. Had 
the sentencing judge been quite sure that the defendant 
could not pay the fine, I cannot believe that the court would 
not have imposed some jail time or that either the Due Proc-
ess or Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution would pre-
vent such imposition. 
Poverty does not insulate those who break the law from 
punishment. When probation is revoked for failure to pay a 
fine, I find nothing in the Constitution to prevent the trial 
court from revoking probation and imposing a term of impris-
onment if revocation does not automatically result in the im-
position of a long jail term and if the sentencing court makes 
a good-faith effort to impose a jail sentence that in terms of 
the state's sentencing objectives will be roughly equivalent to 
the fine and restitution that the defendant failed to pay. See 
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Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 284-287 (WHITE, J., 
dissenting). 
The Court holds, however, that if a probationer cannot pay 
the fine for reasons not of his own fault, the sentencing court 
must at least consider alternative measures of punishment 
other than imprisonment, and may imprison the probationer 
only if the alternative measures are deemed inadequate to 
meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence. 
Ante, at 12. There is no support in our cases or, in my view, 
the Constitution, for this novel requirement. 
In this case, however, the state court did not appear to find 
that the prison term imprevef:i was "a rational and necessary 
trade-off to punish the individual who possessed no accumu-
lated assets", Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 265 (Har-
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trade-off to punish the individual who possessed no accumu-
lated assets", Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 265 (Har-
lan, J., concurring). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
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Re: No. 81-6633, Bearden v. Georgia 
The basic difference between Justice O'Connor's first 
draft and her earlier memorandum is that she now states that in 
assessing whether to revoke probation for failure to pay a fine, a 
sentencing court may choose imprisonment if it determines that 
alternative means of punishment are not adequate (the opinion 
previously had used the term "feasible"). By introducing the word 
adequate, the opinion accords more flexibility to the trial judge 
and comes closer to your position. 
The opinion does not address, however, the equivalent 
penalty issue and I am inclined to recommend staying with Justice 
White's concurrence • 
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Dear Sandra, 
Please join me. 
Justice O'Connor 
Sincerely, 
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May 12, 1983 
Re: No. 81-6633 Bearden v. Georgia 
Dear Sandra: 
Because I was the only person voting to affirm at 
Conference, I have stayed out of the exchanges among the 
colleagues on this case up to now. 
As I understand your present circulation of May 11th, 
when an indigent probationer fails to . pay a fine imposed as 
a condition of probation, the court may impose a prison term 
if it finds that the indigent could have paid the fine or 
made more effort than he has to obtain the means to pay it. 
But if the probationer has done everything he could along 
this line, the court may imprison him only if it has 
"determined that alternatives to imprisonment are not 
adequate in a particular situation to meet the State's 
interest in punishment and deterrence." 
I find it hard to spell out such a requirement from the 
Constitution, and in this respect agree with what I take to 
be the sense of Lewis' letter of May 2nd, and Byron's letter 
of May 9th: When the probationer fails to pay the fine, the 
trial court should make "a good-faith effort to impose a 
jail sentence that in terms of the State's sentencing 
objectives will be roughly equivalent to the fine and 
restitution that the defendant failed to pay." BRW letter 
of May 9th. But beyond the consideration of alternatives 
necessarily involved in that decision, I would not require 
separate findings, review, and the like. As presently 
advised, I think I prefer Byron's view to the one expresse 
in your present draft. 
Sincerely (r!YJ'f 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
---
'· . 
"' l2, .1983 
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Please show me as joining your concurrence 
dated May 12, 1983. 
Regards, 
Justice White 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81--6633 
DANNY R. BEARDEN, PETITIONER v. GEORGIA 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
GEORGIA 
[May -, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits a State from revoking an indigent de-
fendant's probation for failure to pay a fine and restitution. 
Its resolution involves a delicate balance between the accept-
ability, and indeed wisdom, of considering all relevant factors 
when determining an appropriate sentence for an individual 
and the impermissibility of imprisoning a defendant solely be-
cause of his lack of financial resources. We conclude that the 
trial court erred in automatically revoking probation because 
petitioner could not pay his fine, without determining that 
petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or 
that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist. 
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Georgia Court of 
Appeals upholding the revocation of probation, and remand 
for a new sentencing determination. 
I 
In September 1980, petitioner was indicted for the felonies 
of burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. He 
pleaded guilty, and was sentenced on October 8, 1980. Pur-
suant to the Georgia First Offender's Act, Ga. Code. Ann. 
§§ 27-2727 et seq. (current version at §§ 42-8-60 et seq. (1982 
Supp.)), the trial court did not enter a judgment of guilt, but 
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three years on probation for the burglary charge and a con-
current one year on probation for the theft charge. As a 
condition of probation, the trial court ordered petitioner to 
pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution. 1 Petitioner was to 
pay $100 that day, $100 the next day, and the $550 balance 
within four months. 
Petitioner borrowed money from his parents and paid the 
first $200. About a month later, however, petitioner was 
laid off from his job. Petitioner, who has only a ninth grade 
education and cannot read, tried repeatedly to find other 
work but was unable to do so. The record indicates that pe-
titioner had no income or assets during this period. 
Shortly before the balance of the fine and restitution came 
due in February 1981, petitioner notified the probation office 
he was going to be late with his payment because he could not 
find a job. In May 1981, the State filed a petition in the trial 
court to revoke petitioner's probation because he had not 
paid the balance. 2 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court revoked probation for failure to pay the balance of the 
fine and restitution, 3 entered a conviction and sentenced pe-
1 The trial court ordered a payment of $200 restitution for the theft by 
receiving charge; and ordered payment of $50 in restitution and $500 fine 
for the burglary charge. 
The other conditions of probation prohibited petitioner from leaving the 
jurisdiction of the court without permission, from drinking alcoholic bever-
ages, using or possessing narcotics, or visiting places where alcoholic bev-
erages or narcotics are sold, from keeping company with persons of bad 
reputation, from violating any penal law; and required him to avoid places 
of disreputable character, to work faithfully at suitable employment insofar 
as possible, and to report to the probation officer as directed and to permit 
the probation officer to visit him. 
2 The State's petition alleged two grounds for revoking probation: peti-
tioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution, and an alleged burglary he 
committed on May 10, 1981. The State abandoned the latter ground at the 
hearing to revoke probation, and counsel has informed us that petitioner 
was later acquitted of the charge. Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 1. 
3 The trial court also found that petitioner violated the conditions of pro-
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titioner to serve the remaining portion of the probationary 
period in prison. 4 The Georgia Court of Appeals, relying on 
earlier Georgia Supreme Court cases, 5 rejected petitioner's 
claim that imprisoning him for inability to pay the fine vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Georgia Supreme Court denied review. Since 
other courts have held that revoking the probation of indi-
gents for failure to pay fines does violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 6 we granted certiorari to resolve this important 
issue in the administration of criminal justice. 458 U. S. 
- (1981). 
II 
This Court has long been sensitive to the treatment of indi-
gents in our criminal justice system. Over a quarter-cen-
tury ago, Justice Black declared that "there can be no equal 
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the 
amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 
19 (1956) (plurality opinion). Griffin's principle of "equal 
justice," which the Court applied there to strike down a state 
bation by failing to report to his probation officer as directed. Since the 
trial court was unauthorized under state law to revoke probation on a 
ground not stated in the petition, Radcliffv. State, 134 Ga. App. 244, 214 
S.E. 2d 179 (1975), the court of appeals upheld the revocation solely on the 
basis of petitioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution. 
4 The trial court first sentenced petitioner to five years in prison, with a 
concurrent three-year sentence for the theft conviction. Since the record 
of the initial sentencing hearing failed to reveal that petitioner had been 
warned that a violation of probation could result in a longer prison term 
than the original probationary period, as required by Stevens v. State, 245 
Ga. 835, 268 S.E. 2d 330 (1980), the court reduced the prison term to the 
remainder of the probationary period. 
5 Hunter v. Dean, 240 Ga. 214, 239 S.E. 2d 791 (1977); Calhoun v. 
Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E. 2d 455 (1974). 
6 See, e. g., Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F. 2d 726 (CA5 1972); In re Antazo, 
3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P. 2d 999 (1970); State v. Tackett, 52 Haw. 601, 483 P. 2d 
191 (1971); State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A. 2d 137 (1971); State ex 
rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286, 201 N. W. 2d 778 (1972). 
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practice of granting appellate review only to persons able to 
afford a trial transcript, has been applied in numerous other 
contexts. See, e. g., Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 
(1963) (indigent entitled to counsel on first direct appeal); 
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967) (indigent entitled to 
free transcript of preliminary hearing for use at trial); Mayer 
v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971) (indigent cannot be denied 
an adequate record to appeal a conviction under a fine-only 
statute). Most relevant to the issue here is the holding in 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), that a State cannot 
subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of 
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely because 
they are too poor to pay the fine. Williams was followed 
and extended in Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), which 
held that a State cannot convert a fine imposed under a fine-
only statute into a jail term solely because the defendant is 
indigent and cannot immediately pay the fine in full. But the 
Court has also recognized limits on the principle of protecting 
indigents in the criminal justice system. For example, in 
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), we held that indigents 
had no constitutional right to appointed counsel for a dis-
cretionary appeal. In United States v. MacCallum, 426 
U. S. 317 (1976) (plurality opinion), we rejected an equal pro-
tection challenge to a federal statute which permits a district 
court to provide an indigent with a free trial transcript only if 
the court certifies that the challenge to his conviction is not 
frivolous and the transcript is necessary to prepare his 
petition. 
Due process and equal protection principles converge in 
the Court's analysis in these cases. See Griffin v. Illinois, 
supra, at 17. Most decisions in this area have rested on an 
equal protection framework, although Justice Harlan in par-
ticular has insisted that a due process approach more accu-
rately captures the competing concerns. See, e. g., Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 29-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wil-
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liams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 259-266 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). As we recognized in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S., 
at 608--609, we generally analyze the fairness of relations be-
tween the criminal defendant and the State under the Due 
Process Clause, while we approach the question whether the 
State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a sub-
stantial benefit available to another class of defendants under 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
The question presented here is whether a sentencing court 
can revoke a defendant's probation for failure to pay the im-
posed fine and restitution, absent evidence and findings that 
the defendant was somehow responsible for the failure or 
that alternative forms of punishment were inadequate. The 
parties, following the framework of Williams and Tate, have 
argued the question primarily in terms of equal protection, 
and debate vigorously whether strict scrutiny or rational 
basis is the appropriate standard of review. There is no 
doubt that the State has treated the petitioner differently 
from a person who did not fail to pay the imposed fine and 
therefore did not violate probation. To determine whether 
this differential treatment violates the Equal Protection 
Clause, one must determine whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, a defendant's indigent status may be considered 
in the decision whether to revoke probation. This is sub-
stantially similar to asking directly the due process question 
of whether and when it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary 
for the State to revoke probation when an indigent is unable 
to pay the fine. 7 Whether analyzed in terms of equal protec-
7 We have previously applied considerations of procedural and substan-
tive fairness to probation and parole revocation proceedings. In Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), where we established certain proce-
dural requirements for parole revocation hearings, we recognized that 
society has an "interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness." I d., at 
484. We addressed the issue of fundamental fairness more directly in 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1972), where we held that in certain 
cases "fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require 
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tion or due process, 8 the issue cannot be resolved by resort to 
easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a 
careful inquiry into such factors as "the nature of the individ-
ual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the 
rationality of the connection between legislative means and 
purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectu-
ating the purpose .... " Williams v. Illinois, supra, at 260 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
In analyzing this issue, of course, we do not write on a 
clean slate, for both Williams and Tate analyzed similar situ-
ations. The reach and limits of their holdings are vital to a 
proper resolution of the issue here. In Williams, a defend-
ant was sentenced to the maximum prison term and fine au-
thorized under the statute. Because of his indigency he 
could not pay the fine. Pursuant to another statute equating 
a $5 fine with a day in jail, the defendant was kept in jail for 
that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or 
parolees." !d., at 790. Fundamental fairness, we determined, presump-
tively requires counsel when the probationer claims that "there are sub-
stantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revoca-
tion inappropriate." Ibid. In Douglas v. Buder, 412 U. S. 430 (1973), we 
found a substantive violation of due process when a state court had revoked 
probation with no evidence that the probationer had violated probation. 
Today we address whether a court can revoke probation for failure to pay a 
fine and restitution when there is no evidence that the petitioner was at 
fault in his failure to pay or that alternate means of punishment were 
inadequate. 
8 A due process approach has the advantage in this context of directly 
confronting the intertwined question of the role that a defendant's financial 
background can play in determining an appropriate sentence. When the 
court is initially considering what sentence to impose, a defendant's level of 
financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather than a classification. 
Since indigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classifica-
tion, fitting "the problem of this case into an equal protection framework is 
a task too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished," North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 723 (1969). The more appropriate question is 
whether consideration of a defendant's financial background in setting or 
resetting a sentence is so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due 
process. 
81-663~0PINION 
BEARDEN v. GEORGIA 7 
101 days beyond the maximum prison sentence to "work out" 
the fine. The Court struck down the practice, holding that 
"[o]nce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration 
necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it 
may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants 
to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum 
solely by reason of their indigency." 399 U. S., at 233-234. 
In Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), we faced a similar situ-
ation, except that the statutory penalty there permitted only 
a fine. Quoting from a concurring opinion in Morris v. 
Schoon.field, 399 U. S. 508, 509 (1970), we reasoned that "the 
same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also in-
heres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate pay-
ment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a 
jail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent ex-
tends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a 
person willing and able to pay a fine." 401 U. S., at 398. 
The rule of Williams and Tate, then, is that the State can-
not "impos[e] a fine as a sentence and then automatically con-
ver[t] it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indi-
gent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full." Tate, supra, 
at 398. In other words, if the State determines a fine to be 
the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may 
not thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the 
resources to pay it. Both Williams and Tate carefully dis-
tinguished this substantive limitation on the imprisonment of 
indigents from the situation where a defendant was at fault in 
failing to pay the fine. As the Court made clear in Williams, 
"nothing in our decision today precludes imprisonment for 
willful refusal to pay a fine or court costs." 399 U. S., at 
242, n. 19. Likewise in Tate, the Court "emphasize[d] that 
our holding today does not suggest any constitutional infir-
mity in imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a 
fine who refuses or neglects to do so." 401 U. S., at 400. 
This distinction, based on the reasons for non-payment, is 
of critical importance here. If the probationer has willfully 
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refused to pay the fine when he has the means to pay, the 
State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanc-
tion to enforce collection. See ALI, Model Penal Code 
§ 302.2(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Similarly, a proba-
tioner's failure to make sufficient efforts to seek employment 
or borrow money in order to pay the fine or restitution may 
reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to 
society for his crime. In such a situation, the State is like-
wise justified in revoking probation and using imprisonment 
as an appropriate penalty for the offense. But if the proba-
tioner has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine, and yet 
cannot do so through no fault of his own, 9 it is fundamentally 
unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering 
whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the de-
fendant are available. This lack of fault provides a "substan-
tial reaso[n] which justifie[s] or mitigate(s] the violation and 
make revocation inappropriate." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
supra, at 790. 10 Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 400 
9 We do not suggest that, in other contexts, the probationer's lack of 
fault in violating a term of probation would necessarily prevent a court 
from revoking probation. For instance, it may indeed be reckless for a 
court to permit a person convicted of driving while intoxicated to remain on 
probation once it becomes evident that efforts at controlling his chronic 
drunken driving have failed. Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968); 
Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962). Ultimately, it must be re-
membered that the sentence was not imposed for a circumstance beyond 
the probationer's control "but because he had committed a crime." Wil-
liams, supra, at 242. In contrast to a condition like chronic drunken driv-
ing, however, the condition at issue here-indigency-is itself no threat to 
the safety or welfare of society. 
10 Numerous decisions by state and federal courts have recognized that 
basic fairness forbids the revocation of probation when the probationer is 
without fault in his failure to pay the fine. For example, in United States 
v. Boswell, 605 F. 2d 171 (CA5 1979), the court distinguished between re-
voking probation where the defendant did not have the resources to pay 
restitution and had no way to acquire them-a revocation the court found 
improper-from revoking probation where the defendant had the re-
sources to pay or had negligently or deliberately allowed them to be dissi-
pated in a manner that resulted in his inability to pay-an entirely legiti-
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(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) (distinguishing, under both 
due process and equal protection analyses, persons who shirk 
their moral and legal obligation to pay child support from 
those wholly unable to pay). 
The State, of course, has a fundamental interest in appro-
priately punishing persons-rich and poor-who violate its 
criminal laws. A defendant's poverty in no way immunizes 
him from punishment. Thus, when determining initially 
whether the State's penological interests require imposition 
of a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court can consider 
the entire background of the defendant, including his employ-
ment history and financial resources. See Williams v. New 
York, 337 U. S. 247, 250, and n. 15 (1949). As we said in 
Williams v. Illinois, "[a]fter having taken into consideration 
the wide range of factors underlying the exercise of his sen-
tencing function, nothing we now hold precludes a judge from 
imposing on an indigent, as on any defendant, the maximum 
penalty prescribed by law." 399 U. S., at 243. 
The decision to place the defendant on probation, however, 
reflects a determination by the sentencing court that the 
State's penological interests do not require imprisonment. 
mate action by the trial court. Accord, United States v. Taylor, 321 F. 2d 
339 (CA41965); United States v. Wilson, 469 F . 2d 368 (CA2 1972); State v. 
Huggett, 525 P. 2d 1119 (Haw. 1974); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 115-117, 
473 P. 2d 999, 1007-1009 (1970); Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266 
N. W. 2d 403, 408 (1978). Commentators have similarly distinguished be-
tween the permissibility of revoking probation for contumacious failure to 
pay a fine, and the impermissibility of revoking probation when the proba-
tioner made good-faith efforts to pay. See, e. g., ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice 18-7.4 and Commentary (2d ed. 1980) ("incarceration 
should be employed only after the court has examined the reasons for non-
payment"); ALI, Model Penal Code§ 302.2 (distinguishing "contumacious" 
failure to pay fine from "good faith effort" to obtain funds); National Advi-
sory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections 
§ 5.5 (1973); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act§§ 3-403, 3-404 (1978). See 
also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 1304; Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, 
~ 1005-6-4(d). 
81-6633-0PINION 
10 BEARDEN v. GEORGIA 
See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S., at 264 (Harlan, J., con-
curring); Woods v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 286-287 (WHITE, 
J., dissenting). A probationer's failure to make reasonable 
efforts to repay his debt to society may indicate that this 
original determination needs reevaluation, and imprisonment 
may now be required to satisfy the State's interests. But a 
probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay 
his fine and restitution, and who has complied with the other 
conditions of probation, has demonstrated a willingness to 
pay his debt to society and an ability to conform his conduct 
to social norms. The State nevertheless asserts three rea-
sons why imprisonment is required to further its penal goals. 
First, the State argues that revoking probation furthers its 
interest in ensuring that restitution be paid to the victims of 
crime. A rule that imprisonment may befall the probationer 
who fails to make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay restitu-
tion may indeed spur probationers to try hard to pay, 
thereby increasing the number of probationers who make 
restitution. Such a goal is fully served, however, by revok-
ing probation only for persons who have not made sufficient 
bona fide efforts to pay. Revoking the probation of someone 
who through no fault of his own is unable to make restitution 
will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming. Indeed, 
such a policy may have the perverse effect of inducing the 
probationer to use illegal means to acquire funds to pay in 
order to avoid revocation. 
Second, the State asserts that its interest in rehabilitating 
the probationer and protecting society requires it to remove 
him from the temptation of committing other crimes. This is 
no more than a naked assertion that a probationer's poverty 
by itself indicates he may commit crimes in the future and 
thus that society needs for him to be incapacitated. We have 
already indicated that a sentencing court can consider a 
defendant's employment history and financial resources in 
setting an initial punishment. Such considerations are a nec-
essary part of evaluating the entire background of the de-
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fendant in order to tailor an appropriate sentence for the de-
fendant and crime. But it must remembered that the State 
is seeking here to use as the sole justification for imprison-
ment the poverty of a probationer who, by assumption, has 
demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to find a job and pay 
the fine and whom the State initially thought it unnecessary 
to imprison. Given the significant interest of the individual 
in remaining on probation, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U. S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), 
the State cannot justify incarcerating a probationer who has 
demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his debt to 
society, solely by lumping him together with other poor per-
sons and thereby classifying him as dangerous. 11 This would 
be little more than punishing a person for his poverty. 
Third, and most plausibly, the State argues that its inter-
ests in punishing the lawbreaker and deterring others from 
criminal behavior require it to revoke probation for failure to 
pay a fine or restitution. The State clearly has an interest in 
punishment and deterrence, but this interest can often be 
served fully by alternative means. As we said in Williams, 
399 U. S., at 244, and reiterated in Tate, 401 U. S., at 399, 
"[t]he State is not powerless to enforce judgments against 
those financially unable to pay a fine." For example, the 
sentencing court could extend the time for making payments, 
or reduce the fine, or direct that the probationer perform 
some form of labor or public service in lieu of the fine. Jus-
tice Harlan appropriately observed in his concurring opinion 
in Williams that "the deterrent effect of a fine is apt to de-
rive more from its pinch on the purse than the time of pay-
ment." Ibid., at 265. Indeed, given the general flexibility 
of tailoring fines to the resources of a defendant, or even per-
11 The State emphasizes several empirical studies suggesting a correla-
tion between poverty and crime. E. g., Green, Race, Social Status, and 
Criminal Arrest, 35 Amer. Soc. Rev. 476 (1978); M. Wolfgang, R. Figlio, 
& T. Sellin, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort (1972). 
·' 
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mitting the defendant to do specified work to satisfy the fine, 
see Williams, supra, at 244, n. 21, a sentencing court can 
often establish a reduced fine or alternate public service in 
lieu of a fine that adequately serves the State's goals of pun-
ishment and deterrence, given the defendant's diminished fi-
nancial resources. Only if the sentencing court determines 
that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a par-
ticular situation to meet the State's interest in punishment 
and deterrence may the State imprison a probationer who 
has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. 
We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for fail-
ure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must in-
quire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the proba-
tioner willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient 
bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the 
court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to 
imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing 
authority. If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient 
bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court 
must consider alternate measures of punishment other than 
imprisonment. Only if alternate measures are not adequate 
to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence 
may the court imprison a probationer who has made suffi-
cient bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would de-
prive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply be-
cause, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. 
Such a deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental 
fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 
12 As our holding makes clear, we agree with JUSTICE WHITE that pov-
erty does not insulate a criminal defendant from punishment o~cessarily 
prevent revocation of his probation for inability to pay a fine . We reject 
as impractical, however, the approach suggested by JUSTICE WHITE. He 
would require a "good-faith effort" by the sentencing court to impose a 
term of imprisonment that is "roughly equivalent" to the fine and restitu-
tion that the defendant failed to pay. Post, at 1. Even putting to one 
side the question of judicial "good faith," we perceive no meaningful stand-
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III 
We return to the facts of this case. At the parole revoca-
tion hearing, the petitioner and his wife testified about their 
lack of income and assets and of his repeated efforts to obtain 
work. While the sentencing court commented on the avail-
ability of odd jobs such as lawn-mowing, it made no finding 
that the petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to 
find work, and the record as it presently stands would not 
justify such a finding. This lack of findings is understand-
able, of course, for under the rulings of the Georgia Supreme 
Court 13 such an inquiry would have been irrelevant to the 
constitutionality of revoking probation. The State argues 
that the sentencing court determined that the petitioner was 
no longer a good probation risk. In the absence of a deter-
mination that the petitioner did not make sufficient bona fide 
efforts to pay or to obtain employment in order to pay, we 
cannot read the opinion of the sentencing court as reflecting 
such a finding. Instead, the court curtly rejected counsel's 
suggestion that the time for making the payments be ex-
tended, saying that "the fallacy in that argument" is that the 
petitioner has long known he had to pay the $550 and yet did 
not comply with the court's prior order to pay. App. 45. 
The court declared that "I don't know any way to enforce the 
ard by which a sentencing or reviewing court could assess whether a given 
prison sentence has an equivalent sting to the original fine. For that rea-
son, we hold that the sentencing court must focus on criteria typically con-
sidered daily by sentencing courts throughout the land in probation revoca-
tion hearings: whether the defendant has demonstrated sufficient efforts to 
comply with the terms of probation and whether non-imprisonment alter-
natives are adequate to satisfy the State's interests in punishment and de-
terrence. Nor is our requirement that the sentencing court consider alter-
native forms of punishment a "novel" requirement. In both Williams and 
Tate, the Court emphasized the availability of alternate forms of punish-
ment in holding that indigents could not be subjected automatically to 
imprisonment. 
13 See cases cited at n. 5, supra. 
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prior orders of the Court but one way," which was to sen-
tence him to imprisonment. Ibid. 
The focus of the court's concern, then, was that the peti-
tioner had disobeyed a prior court order to pay the fine, and 
for that reason must be imprisoned. But this is no more 
than imprisoning a person solely because he lacks funds to 
pay the fine, a practice we condemned in Williams and Tate. 
By sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he 
could not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for 
the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or 
extending the time for payments or making alternative or-
ders, the court automatically turned a fine into a prison 
sentence. 
We do not suggest by our analysis of the present record 
that the State may not place the petitioner in prison. If, 
upon remand, the Georgia courts determine that petitioner 
did not make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay his fine, or de-
termine that alternate punishment is not adequate to meet 
the State's interests in punishment and deterrence, imprison-
ment would be a permissible sentence. Unless such deter-
minations are made, however, fundamental fairness requires 
that the petitioner remain on probation. 
IV 
The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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